

PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
IN AFRICA

4. F 76/1:P 31/18

Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution...

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

MARCH 31, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



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PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 31, 1993

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Harry L. Johnston (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I call the meeting to order. The subcommittee meets today to consider peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa.

Africa in many places is still at war with itself. The cessation of these wars is a necessary condition for the economic development and the democratization of Africa. In Angola, Zaire, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, war has wrecked dreams of a better life.

By dealing with peacekeeping and conflict resolution on a conceptual level, I hope the subcommittee will help create mechanisms to prevent future crises and defuse current ones.

I wish to shift the focus from the symptoms of Africa's conflict to possible cures. In that spirit, I hope to hear specific proposals from our witnesses on how the United States can help make peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa more effective.

Today we have two panels. On the first panel we will hear first from Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Department of State, and James Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Department of Defense.

Mr. Cohen had his swan song the last time he appeared before here. We said nice things about him. We will not repeat them again today. So Mr. Cohen, I ask you to go first, please.

STATEMENT OF HERMAN J. COHEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure to be here. And I want to commend the committee for holding this hearing on a very important subject.

My prepared testimony is rather long, and I am submitting it for the record. And I will extract from that for my oral testimony.

In Africa, conflict resolution is this decade's most urgent challenge. Resolution of Africa's many conflicts is necessary for stability, economic reform, democratization and better government. It is wiser and less expensive to pay for conflict prevention and resolution than to shoulder the immense burdens of refugee assistance,

famine relief, emergency intervention, and rebuilding destroyed infrastructure.

The administration is now conducting a full-scale review of conflict resolution requirements and resources worldwide. We pursue conflict resolution in Africa as a crucial first step toward improving those factors which lead to stability, the rule of law, and good government. We approach conflict resolution and peacekeeping generally in four ways: through preventive diplomacy, through multilateral diplomacy, through participation in mediation efforts, and finally through informal cooperation with such organizations as the Global Coalition for Africa, the Africa Leadership Forum, the African-American Institute, the Carter Center, Africare, and the many other nongovernmental organizations.

Of critical importance is the reinforcement of the Africans' own ability to resolve their internal and regional conflicts. Consequently, much of our assistance concentrates on building the conflict resolution capacity of existing organizations, such as the OAU and ECOWAS. The OAU is now developing a permanent peacekeeping structure.

In many countries, direct assistance has been appropriate. With the World Bank and other donors, we are now beginning to assist with the reduction of oversized military forces and the redefinition of the remaining forces' roles in Uganda. We are studying creative ways to assistance demobilization and downsizing of military establishments in other parts of the continent.

Allow me to review briefly the areas where we are or have been extensively engaged in peacekeeping. The negotiations leading to Namibian independence, which took place in 1977 to 1988, were a triumph of U.S. diplomacy. In the final stages of the process, 1987 to 1988, the United States was the official mediator.

In Angola, the United States, the Portuguese and the former Soviet Union worked closely to achieve the 1991 cease-fire, which temporarily ended 15 years of civil war. In Liberia, the parties looked to the United States for assistance in the early stages of conflict because of our historical relationship.

Our involvement in Ethiopia was stimulated in part by the United States' desire to cooperate with then Soviet President Gorbachev in resolving regional conflicts.

In Mozambique, U.S. involvement began several years ago with an effort to persuade President Chissano to accept that negotiations with RENAMO were essential.

In Rwanda we have had facilitators in the field throughout the last 10 months trying to keep the parties talking. The U.S. plans to continue its support for the OAU peacekeeping force now deployed in northern Rwanda.

We have provided about \$1 million to date in FMF and ESF to this first important OAU effort to end a tragic civil war.

In Somalia, we are working with the United Nations to rebuild a badly fragmented society. South Africa presents a unique problem. Conflict resolution in South Africa is a factor critical to the success of transition to a representative and nonracial government, and to economic development in that country, the region, and the continent.

Where we can help with assistance and simple, honest brokering, we intend to do so. Although informal and low-key, our inputs over the past 3 years have been significant. We will continue to be engaged in helping Africans resolve conflicts in the future.

We have learned some important lessons. U.S. involvement in conflict resolution is considered desirable by most Africans. Our involvement reassures the parties, and the presence of the only remaining superpower seems to serve as a moral guarantee that agreements will be implemented.

Agreements must be simple and workable. Joint commissions formed solely by representative of parties to the conflict do not work well. There needs to be a referee. We cannot rush elections. Amnesty must be part of the equation. Force must sometimes be part of the equation. ECOWAS mediation in Liberia was ineffective without ECOMOG; U.S.-led international involvement in Somalia provided a chance for national reconciliation.

We also have a few ideas to improve the conflict resolution process in Africa, and make our own role more effective. We need a regular mechanism for U.S. involvement, since the United States is generally considered impartial, and U.S. technical assistance, especially in juridical and military matters, is highly valued.

Advice and assistance should be provided to professionalize and integrate downsizing military establishments. The examples of Somalia and Liberia set precedents for the use of force to end actual fighting and make conditions more fertile for negotiation.

Africans are willing to pay a price for this involvement, as Nigeria has in paying the lion's share of ECOMOG expenses. But they will look to the international community to help them.

The development of regularized African mechanisms for conflict resolution is indispensable for long-term stability. The United States is committed to helping the OAU establish such mechanisms, as we demonstrated by providing \$1 million toward the OAU's initial conflict resolution and peacekeeping effort in Rwanda.

Finally, donor governments, the economic community of Europe, international financial institutions, and United Nations agencies are important contributors to African development. And we share with them an interest in Africa's need for internal stability. We are coordinating closely with interested in governments and institutions in every case. And several governments and other institutions have contributed, financially and otherwise, to the conflict resolution effort in individual countries.

As Africa attempts to meet the difficult challenge of conflict resolution, the Bureau of African Affairs intends to remain involved to help ensure the success of practical mechanisms and long-term efforts to build trust, tolerance, and accountability.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Cohen. Before I go to Mr. Woods, I wanted to know if Mr. Diaz-Balart would like to make an opening statement.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening statement. After the witnesses' statements, I would like to have—

Mr. JOHNSTON. All right. Mr. Edwards, Mr. Woods, you are on.

**STATEMENT OF JAMES L. WOODS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS**

Mr. WOODS. Thank you. I am Jim Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs.

Mr. Chairman, I, too, have a statement which was submitted, and I will hit the highlights of it but not read the whole thing.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The entire statement by you and by Mr. Cohen will be a matter of public record.

Mr. WOODS. Yes, sir, thank you. Before I actually begin the statement I would like to return to a word you used in your opening remarks, which was "specifics". What I think, at least, I will be able to do today here is not lay out a blueprint full of specifics as to how we are going to solve this problem, but give you an indication of some of the things we have been doing, some of the possibilities we see lying ahead, and to begin a process of dialogue with the Congress so that the executive and legislative branches, hopefully in due course, will arrive at a consensus on which of these things should be pursued and where to find the resources to do this in a fiscally constrained environment.

But in that spirit, I am happy to make some suggestions.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we do thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense's interest in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa. I would emphasize that Defense's interest in Africa is generally not a defense or a military interest, narrowly defined, but in support of broader, overall national interests.

Secretary Cohen has outlined very well our commitment to conflict resolution in Africa and the high priority we assign to that activity. We consider ourselves in support of that overall national effort.

I need to emphasize, for several reasons, that I am not appearing here as an expert on peacekeeping, but as a person with policy oversight for African affairs, since 1986 as Deputy Assistant Secretary. I have followed these issues of peacekeeping and conflict resolution very closely. I have personally been involved from time to time as a member of negotiating teams formed by the Department of State. I have attempted to encourage greater support of peacekeeping on an interagency basis. I am happy to share my views; but what I will give you are not authoritative rules or views of the Department of Defense on peacekeeping in general.

As my office has become increasingly involved in conflict resolution, we have noticed a certain amount of confusion in the use of "terms of art." Let me, without going into all of the details which are in my paper, point out there is a spectrum or phases of conflict resolution and peacekeeping leading from preventive diplomacy, through peacemaking, through peacekeeping, to peace enforcement—as we now see in Somalia. In some minds, there is also a phase I think is very important—peace building, in "post-conflict" situations. We are interested in—and I think one of the things we need to be attentive to is that U.S. Government and international approaches be mindful that this is a cycle, and that there are corrective and preventive measures which need to be taken at all points in the cycle, which ever repeats itself, I am afraid.

For now, the lead organization for conflict resolution, in Africa and everywhere else, is the United Nations. I will have some suggestions about the U.N. But also, there are regional organizations which are quite important. Let me turn to some of those, as well.

In Africa, we have worked with several non-U.N. conflict resolution efforts. We have worked with ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States; with the Organization of African Unity; and on some occasions, we have also worked bilaterally or with ad hoc groups of actors.

Some examples. The ad hoc ECOWAS intervention in Liberia beginning in August 1990, through its military arm, ECOMOG. The United States has strongly supported that effort. Ambassador Cohen gave a few details.

Following the ECOWAS/ECOMOG intervention, we provided, to the civilian side from ESF, a little over \$10 million in 1991 funds and from the fiscal year 1991 FMF military account, we provided \$3.45 million.

A comment I would make, is that in order to provide military aid to any state or organization, there must be a "Presidential Determination" qualifying that organization. There is none for ECOWAS. What we were able to do is provide a limited amount of military assistance to the bilateral components, components of ECOMOG on a bilateral basis. We could not, per se, aid ECOMOG itself.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Excuse me. Say that again.

Mr. WOODS. OK. In order to provide military assistance—

Mr. JOHNSTON. You had to be certified by the President.

Mr. WOODS [continuing]. To any country or organization, you must have what is called a formal Presidential Determination. That is published, saying that this country or this organization is eligible to receive—

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK. ECOMOG was not on the list.

Mr. WOODS. ECOWAS, the parent organization of ECOMOG, is not on that list. But we were able to give assistance to the individual country components—not all of them, but most of them. That was the legal basis for doing that.

Mr. JOHNSTON. And they then funneled the military equipment to ECOMOG?

Mr. WOODS. No, they kept it themselves to participate in ECOMOG.

Mr. JOHNSTON. And they were under the umbrella of ECOMOG.

Mr. WOODS. That is right, sir.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I am sorry. Please continue.

Mr. WOODS. I will come back to that point when I talk about what we are doing with the OAU, or started to do.

The OAU is itself working to develop its conflict resolution mechanisms. Although it has been involved in peacekeeping operations, it had not developed a standing capacity to respond to the needs for mediation, conciliation and arbitration in Africa.

At the 1992 OAU summit, Secretary General Salim Salim proposed that the OAU move full time into managing conflicts. Now the OAU recognized that it would need outside assistance in sustaining this effort.

The United States has moved to provide assistance to that initiative. In early 1991, Ambassador Cohen and I agreed to seek a Pres-

idential Determination which would make the OAU eligible for U.S. security assistance support. The President approved that recommendation and issued a Determination on August 25, 1992.

We then moved promptly to provide the OAU with not much, but a start: a half-million dollars in economic support funds, and another half-million in FMF funding.

Subsequently, we designated our military attache in Addis Ababa as the liaison officer to the OAU, which is the first step. He has begun to work with his military counterparts to identify ways in which we might help improve the OAU's planning and execution capabilities for peacekeeping.

Now, the first use of some of that money was agreed to be in Rwanda in support of the OAU's cease-fire monitoring force down there. We have also been involved in diplomatic efforts to try to help end that civil war.

U.S. observer delegations, including military experts, have provided technical advice and guidance to the OAU-sponsored peace negotiations. Lt. Col. Tony Marley, who was on my staff and is now working for Ambassador Cohen at State, has since late February been shuttling between Kigali, Kampala, and Arusha providing technical advice to both parties in trying to settle this conflict.

As Ambassador Cohen pointed out, there is a perception that the United States is an honest broker, and when the United States is involved in this way it does facilitate communications between the parties.

I might note, I was intrigued this morning to actually get a cable, an unclassified message, in from Addis Ababa saying, "Where are the mine detectors we need for our OAU troops down there in Rwanda?" So the system has actually started to function; we are beginning to work small cases to meet the needs of the OAU in this effort.

These efforts by Col. Marley and others are examples of the third type of involvement in conflict resolution. That is bilateral or ad hoc multilateral efforts. Since the mid-1980's, I personally, members of my staff, sometimes officers from the joint staff, have been involved as members of Department of State-led teams in many of the conflict resolution negotiations that Ambassador Cohen has described, on Namibia, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique.

In Angola, DOD personnel played an important supporting role in the negotiations. We served as technical advisors on the U.S. delegation. We then provided military officers to serve as observers to the Joint Commissions overseeing the peace process.

To supplement the international emergency relief going into Angola, and also to help provide for soldiers encamped for demobilization, we airlifted from Defense excess stocks over 3 million MRE's—meals ready to eat—thousands of tents, blankets, plastic sheeting, and so on. We also shipped in 140 C-vans of MRE's. We also provided three C-130's, plus communications gear and other support, to assist in demobilization and to help with the electoral preparations. Department of Defense absorbed these costs.

In Mozambique, the U.N. is planning a contingent of up to 8,000 military and civilian personnel, including an international observer force of 350. Before the elections are held, it is critical that a new

national army be formed and trained, and that excess soldiers from both sides be demobilized.

We are providing two military officers in Mozambique to assist our defense attache in participating in the commissions overseeing the peace agreement. In addition, in response to a U.N. request that the United States provide military engineers to assist in road repair in Mozambique, a joint State-DOD engineering assessment team is just completing a fact-finding mission in Mozambique, today in fact. They have been gathering data on the scope of the repairs required, and the U.N.'s capability to support the possible deployment of U.S. engineering assets.

We see in these kinds of cases a potential for the U.S. military to play a peace-building role through involvement with the new armed forces. They would, in any case, require substantial training assistance. We would be joining several of our European allies who have already agreed to provide some of this training initially.

When the political circumstances are right—and this would be State's call—the United States could establish a security assistance program with Angola and we could expand our program with Mozambique. The focus, in our minds, would be mostly on training, through the IMET program. If the Congress has at that time also made FMF funds available to Africa, we could consider these countries' militaries as candidates for assistance in nation-building activities, through the Africa Civic Action Program.

We also think both of these countries would benefit from participation in our coastal security and military biodiversity programs, that latter program being a congressional initiative for Africa. Again, assuming that there is FMF funding available in that year.

Let me return to the U.N. and say this very carefully. There are a number of possibilities being discussed on a military-to-military basis between our joint staff and military experts at the U.N. and others concerned with peacekeeping.

Some of the things which concerned officers at the Pentagon are looking at include reorganizing and expanding the U.N. secretariat to increase the information flow and enhance planning and implementation capabilities.

Two. Establishing an early warning system or systems to alert senior U.N. policymakers before a crisis erupts, so that preventive measures can be taken.

Speeding up the U.N.'s ability to determine that a disaster requiring international response exists. Enhancing the U.N.'s ability to respond quickly with humanitarian assistance. Adopting standardized military procedures and interoperable equipment among U.N.-deployed forces. Communications is particularly critical.

Establishing a U.N. training center to enhance both unilateral and combined training of staffs and forces for this type of mission.

Formation of an integrated U.N. strategy for dealing with these type of complex international emergencies, Somalia and Bosnia being cases in point.

Creating public information resources which can support those efforts.

And notification by member states of specific capabilities that could—repeat, could—be made available for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, as well as possibly stock-

piling those items of equipment which are most likely to be required.

Now, we recognize that suggestions are easy, criticism is easy. We are, in fact, actively looking for ways to help implement some of these and other improvements. We are, or will be, helping the U.N. by temporarily augmenting key positions in the military staff with TDY U.S. military officers.

We will place American personnel, civilian and military, in key positions of the civilian staff of UNOSOM II in Somalia. And we are looking at establishing an intelligence-sharing mechanism. We need to do more. Precisely what to do is being actively considered.

The Department of Defense has been working intensively to develop ideas following President Bush's September 21 speech to the United Nations on peacekeeping. The Clinton administration is now formulating a detailed conflict resolution strategy. All of those elements are not in place. I can describe the broad outlines of two key initiatives which most directly will concern the Department of Defense.

First—and you have seen some reports about this in the press—Secretary Aspin is proposing a reorganization of the so-called "Policy Cluster," where I work, to include establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democratic Security. This office would have conflict resolution and peacekeeping as one of its primary functions.

Presently there is only one individual in the policy staff who works on conflict resolution full time. That is one more than we had 2 years ago, so that is progress. By the end of this year, however, we would hope to have up to 10 people devoted to this important task.

Secondly, the just-submitted fiscal year 1994 defense budget reflects the Clinton administration's commitment to conflict resolution as an important means to promote U.S. interests. Specifically, for the first time Defense has explicitly budgeted not only for ongoing conflict resolution, but for possible future contingencies. The budget contains a request for \$300 million for peacekeeping. This would cover DOD's incremental costs of participating in UNOSOM II in Somalia. It would make substantial funds available to meet new peacekeeping requirements which may arise.

I emphasize that this canvas I am describing is only very partially filled in. We are trying to formulate an overarching policy and strategy on the run, while simultaneously dealing with operations in Somalia, and working in varying degrees on situations in countries such as Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, Togo. And these are only to mention the African examples.

Like State's Africa Bureau, Defense considers itself involved in peacekeeping for the long haul. It is getting much attention, but we are far from having worked out the details. This process will benefit from continuing exchanges between the executive and legislative branches. I am sure the advice and ideas we get from this type of hearing will help us very much.

I thank you for the chance to make this presentation. I look forward to answering your questions, and indeed, getting your suggestions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Woods appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Woods. This morning Mr. Cohen was on a panel in this room in which he outlined five suggestions, one of which was the demobilization of troops in Africa, or to strip troops of a lot of their armaments that have been supplied by the Defense Department and others. I do not want to nail just the United States here.

And he recommended that you use foreign military financing, FMF money, or DA money, up to \$25 million, for this purpose. Do you not think that would probably be money well spent for "democratic security?" Particularly with what has happened in Angola and Somalia.

Mr. WOODS. Let me try to respond in two parts, or maybe three parts. In principle, yes, I think that would be money well spent.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK, we can go on to the next question then.

Mr. WOODS. That is right. [Laughter.]

Secondly, though, the second question is whose money. And then the third question is is there any money.

With respect to whose money to support demobilization, it partly depends on exactly which aspect of demobilization you are talking about. We can—and in Angola we did, for example—provide excess property to help with some of the logistical problems in the camps—you know, tents, rations, and so on, to meet some of those costs.

If it is vocational training that you are talking about, to put the soldiers back on the farm or training them for some mechanics work or whatever, there may be agencies better qualified than Defense.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I am talking about the first, you know, where you go through with—

Mr. WOODS. OK, we can do some of that.

Mr. JOHNSTON [continuing]. A metal detector and get all the weapons out of the country.

Mr. WOODS. Well, collecting, that is really almost a separate problem. There is demobilization, disarmament and encampment, which are very close together. Defense can help in various ways.

If we are supporting a recognized peacekeeping effort of the U.N. or a regional organization, then perhaps we could provide that as a Defense service out of the new fund. I do not know.

If it is a matter of transferring funds to someone else, another agency or entity, or to another country to do some of these things for itself, I think we cannot use that fund, which is to reimburse Defense. We would need FMF. And the fact of the matter is this year we have no FMF for Africa, except for the congressional mandate for biodiversity. And I am not sure we will have any next year.

And there is no worldwide peacekeeping fund in the Defense Security Assistance account.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Cohen, you said that the administration is reviewing conflict resolution. Can you tell me a little more about this review process?

Mr. COHEN. Well, this is a worldwide review being conducted by the National Security Council system, in an interagency process. And a number of issues that are being dealt with include how should we respond to the U.N. Secretary-Generals' of the U.N.'s

July recommendations on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and prevention of conflict.

He has made some very radical proposals, and we will have to respond to those and talk about financing. How do U.S. forces serve under U.N. command? This is a major political issue in the United States, and some decisions will have to be made on that.

How do we finance? How do we support regional peacekeeping issues? Should U.S. money be provided to other countries that are engaged in peacekeeping? These are major issues, all of which include Africa as a subset.

Mr. JOHNSTON. That is my follow-up question. Do you think Africa will benefit from this policy?

Mr. COHEN. I think, to the extent that the United States becomes more involved in peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as we have done in Somalia, Africa will have a large share of the challenges of peacekeeping, and I am sure they will benefit.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Cohen, I will be very blunt. Do you think Sudan is a hopeless case for conflict resolution?

Mr. COHEN. I would not use the term hopeless. For example, we have been pushing the two parties to negotiate for many years now. And I would like to say for the record that I have put as much responsibility for the failure of negotiations on the southern leadership as I do on the governmental leadership.

Because of our operation in Somalia, I think the government has been stimulated to be more forthcoming on negotiations. And because of conflict among themselves, the southern leaders have become more interested in negotiations of late. So recently they both agreed to a cease-fire. They both agreed to meet for negotiations during the month of April under Nigerian mediation. So I would not call it a hopeless case.

However, the humanitarian catastrophe there is very great. It is not getting the media attention that Somalia has been getting, but it is almost as great as Somalia.

Mr. JOHNSTON. You have not seen the picture in Newsweek, then?

Mr. COHEN. Yes, I've seen it.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Of the young girl trying to stand up with a vulture 10 feet in back of her.

Mr. COHEN. Exactly. So I think we have to keep a close watch on it and see how far the negotiations go. The international community should be ready, I think, to escalate its involvement there if the negotiations do not go well.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Diaz-Balart.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have I guess a couple of questions to either or both of our distinguished guests today.

What is the status, the current status, of the conflict in the Sahara? I recall that there is a U.N. mission there, and I have not heard much, either in your testimony today or recently about that conflict. Could you give us your impressions on that?

Mr. COHEN. The conflict in the Western Sahara is the subject of a U.N. peacekeeping operation. The U.N. Security Council has voted a very expensive peacekeeping operation in the Western Sa-

hara designed to end with an act of self-determination by the people of Western Sahara.

There is a special representative of the Secretary-General working there. There is a substantial body of troops there. I do not know the exact number. And it is a rather costly operation, and it is a very frustrating because it has gone so slowly. It seems to be very difficult to reach a political solution in the Western Sahara. And the Security Council has recently, in effect, set a deadline for the end of this year for the completion of the process. And the U.N. Special Representative is now trying to force the pace, getting agreement on the terms of reference for a referendum among the people there.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Would you yield for a follow-up question?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Cohen, the U.N. apparently has come out with ground rules on who can register to vote and who cannot. Have you had an opportunity to review that?

Mr. COHEN. I have not.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. That is precisely my understanding— MR. Cohen. Who should vote and who should not. The major problem in that Polisario seems to be objecting to the U.N. standards with regard to voter criteria. Who is helping Polisario at this point? Who is assisting them?

Mr. COHEN. Well, the Polisario military organization has been based in Algeria. And many refugees from the Western Sahara live across the border in Algeria.

In the past, Polisario has received aid from a number of different countries, including Algeria, including Libya, and a number of Arab states. Polisario's support varies, depending on the political climate.

I cannot say, how much they are getting right now from anyone.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And Mr. Chairman, if I may, another question. I read recently that Mr. Savimbi is stating that the Cubans are beginning to return to Angola. Do you have any confirmation of that?

Mr. COHEN. I do not have any confirmation on that, and I would really doubt that there is any such movement back to Angola.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Why would you doubt?

Mr. COHEN. When the Cubans left Angola, they left with great bitterness and a feeling that "we will never go back to that place again."

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. What would be your summarization of current levels of lingering Cuban involvement in the continent?

Mr. COHEN. There may be some technical assistance personnel, such as doctors and teachers. There may be some personnel who have remained behind because they married local people. But in general, it is minimal.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. In the entire continent?

Mr. COHEN. Yes.

Mr. WOODS. Or negligible. There might be a few Cuban mercenaries, anything to make a buck. But we do not think this report of Cubans coming in through Namibia is in any way credible. We think it is propaganda.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Edwards.

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, would you mind recognizing Mr. Engel before me? I have sent for some material.

Mr. JOHNSTON. All right. Mr. Engel?

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask a few questions about the OAU. In the past, the OAU has refrained from intervening in internal African conflicts ostensibly because of respect for so-called national sovereignty.

Now, I am wondering if there has been any trend or change in the OAU, given the new world order, the collapse of the Soviet Union. Has there been a rethinking in terms of a role that the OAU might play in peacekeeping and conflict resolution?

Mr. COHEN. There has been a significant change. And I give a great deal of credit for that to the Secretary General, Mr. Salim Salim. When he took office approximately 5 years ago, he said the OAU cannot stand by and watch these conflicts and do nothing; he was referring to Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia at the time.

I think he has done a good job of persuading the various chiefs of African state's to accept that the Africans themselves must do more; then must not allow the Americans to take the lead in solving Africa's conflict problems.

When the Somali catastrophe arrived, the Africans were very enthusiastic about international intervention in Somalia. When Rwanda's internal conflict became very, very dangerous, the OAU proposed an OAU peacekeeping force. We were so enthusiastic about it and provided some modest funding to it.

So right now, both on political and military levels, the OAU understands and accepts that international intervention in conflict is important. I think the best example lately is the intervention in Liberia by the West African States. The OAU blessed this intervention by subregional organization, the Economic Community of West African States, in the affairs of a sovereign state.

So I would say psychologically there has been a 180-degree turn-around by the OAU.

Mr. ENGEL. What can we do to help the OAU in these efforts? In moving them even further along the road? And what specifically would you recommend to enhance the OAU's effectiveness in intra-state regional conflicts?

Mr. COHEN. There is a big gap between the OAU's enthusiasm for conflict resolution and their capability. That is quite clear.

The small operation they have in Rwanda is not going too badly, but they will need a lot more help before they can do something much larger.

And I see two ways we can be helpful to them. One is to give them the expertise that they need to develop a conflict resolution capability. Now, conflict resolution is not just sending a top-level diplomat to a conflict area and say, "OK, I am going to do shuttle diplomacy." There is a lot of technical expertise that is required: military, juridical. You need to field whole teams. There is a lot of training involved. You need a secretariat, you need back-up support.

I would propose that for a very modest cost, that there be experts seconded to the OAU to help them develop this, and perhaps give them a little bit of money to help them mature on their own, for personnel and other type of experts. We could use our IMET pro-

grams, which bring foreign military to the United States for training, and focus that training on conflict resolution and how to organize a cease-fire. Organize a withdrawal of forces—that type of very pragmatic training.

And finally, when the OAU does deploy forces, as they did in Liberia, as they do in Rwanda, I think we should use a little bit of our military assistance funds to support them. I think some of this military assistance should be made available to Africa, despite the worldwide shortage of such funds.

Mr. ENGEL. In your testimony, Mr. Cohen, you had mentioned that Americans are generally respected and—I forget the terminology you used—respected and welcomed.

Mr. COHEN. And wanted.

Mr. ENGEL. That our expertise is welcome. Do you find that to be more so now than, say, a decade ago? Is that the trend?

Mr. COHEN. Yes, Mr. Engel, I do find that. The main reason I think is, during the cold war, Africa was polarized and we were one of the poles. So we tended to be highly regarded by some people and with suspicion by others.

Now, the cold war is over and we are the remaining superpower. We do not have major strategical interests in Africa and tend to be welcomed as impartial, straight shooters, who are just interested in peace. We have viewed as having little or no monetary or strategic interests at all. Other countries in the world, especially the former colonial powers, sometimes do not have that benefit.

Mr. ENGEL. I am wondering, Mr. Chairman, if I might ask one question not so much on peacekeeping and conflict resolution, but on the situation in Cameroon. I had an opportunity earlier today to meet with some members of the opposition in Cameroon, and I have been watching the situation very, very closely with regard to their election, questionable election.

And I am wondering, do you see the potentiality of conflict breaking out in Cameroon as a result of the government's action there? What do you see is the situation there?

Mr. COHEN. Well, there already has been in Cameroon what I would call a preconflict situation. There have been massive strikes, there have been demonstrations, police arrests, firing on people, that sort of thing. This is the type of thing that can erupt into something bigger, resulting in refugees and atrocities and what have you.

Here, I think the international community has done some good work in putting a lot of pressure on the government to try and turn the situation around before it gets too late. We have criticized the election. Our National Democratic Institute was there and issued a very tough report on the election. Aid levels have gone down to Cameroon. There has been a lot of media attention. We have made some very strong statements.

So I think now the Cameroonian Government has gotten the message. And they are beginning to include the opposition in constitutional deliberations. They are easing up on some of the repression that they had toward opposition.

So I think we should watch Cameroon closely and continue the pressure on the government.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. And I want to thank you for the fine work you have done.

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Edwards.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My question has to do with the increasing arms sales to developing countries, especially since the end of the cold war. The Congressional Research Service says it has just mushroomed, from \$7 billion in arms sales to the developing world in the 3 years 1986-1989 to, in the last 3 years, \$17 billion.

Are we going to show some restraint in encouraging arms sales? Or are we going to do as we have too much, too often done in the past, and armed a lot of countries that should not be armed? And I think, are a lot of American arms not being used in Somalia, for example?

Mr. COHEN. Well, I think the United States has a fairly effective arms export control regime based on legislation.

Mr. EDWARDS. Then why would these figures be so alarming?

Mr. COHEN. Well, what you are seeing essentially, Congressman, is that a number of countries that have produced a lot of arms in the past—in fact, arms have been their most efficient industry, especially some of the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—they are engaged in arms export in order to earn foreign exchange. And it is probably their main source of foreign exchange.

So you have arms merchants going to many of these conflict areas, knowing that governments and rebel groups both need arms very badly, and they are flogging arms. For example, we have seen reports in Angola, where the civil war has broken out again, of Byelorussia and Bulgarian arms shipments. These are hard cash sales.

And it seems to me it is going to be very difficult to stop these transactions, as long as they provide badly needed foreign exchange. One way of doing it is for the United Nations to have an arms embargo. For example, in the resolution on Somalia, there is a mandatory arms embargo on Somalia. There is a mandatory arms embargo on shipments to Liberia.

And it seems to me we ought to look at more of this type of U.N. legislation. Whereas we in the United States already have it. We are not going to allow arms to be sold to some of these conflict areas. But we need to control some of these other countries which do it for bare necessity on their part.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you. You are telling us, Mr. Cohen, that we are not encouraging arms sales by American arms producers to the developing world; that the other countries are doing it.

Mr. COHEN. In many cases we are preventing it, yes.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you.

Mr. WOODS. I would like to make the observation, I doubt that arms sales are brisk in sub-Saharan Africa. I think they are a small fraction of what they were 5 or 6 years ago. I would like to see data which—

Mr. EDWARDS. I will send you the study by the Congressional Research Service.

Mr. WOODS. The question concerns the developing—what the definition is of the developing world. Africa was getting weapons because the Russians were giving concessional loans; so were we. In some cases we were giving—granted all of that really stopped 5 or 6 years ago. Most of the countries are broke and cannot afford to buy anything. The stuff that we are seeing now, it is true, in Angola and other places, is nickel and dime compared to the rate of arms flow we were seeing 3, 4, and 5 years ago.

I think there is a serious problem in South Asia and parts of the Middle East and other places which still do have money. I agree with Ambassador Cohen. If the Russians and Polish mercenaries or whomever can sell a tank anywhere, they will. But the fact is most of the Africans are broke and cannot afford it.

So I would be very interested in seeing the data that shows sub-Saharan Africa getting much in the way of arms.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank both the witnesses and make my apologies for my tardiness.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to ask unanimous consent that my written opening statement be included in the record.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Sure.

Mr. HASTINGS. And further, I would like to compliment you on allowing for us to have this wonderful room that at least mimics the African unity that we wish that we should have in the way of closeness, and mimics also the heat of the Sahara when it is in full force. [Laughter.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. We like everybody to feel at home. [Laughter.]

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Woods, you intimated that perhaps there would be things that could be learned from these exchanges. Most times, we ask a series of questions. I would like to, if I may, with the permission of the Chair, make a couple of suggestions, in the great hopes that your good offices and Mr. Cohen's good offices may be persuaded to at least give some thought to what I am about to say.

If my recollection serves me properly, the last President to visit Africa or set foot on it would be John Kennedy. If I am in error, then—

Mr. JOHNSTON. President Carter.

Mr. COHEN. You mean while he was President. While he was President.

Mr. HASTINGS. Jimmy Carter?

Mr. COHEN. Jimmy Carter went to Nigeria.

Mr. HASTINGS. All right. If we are serious about the Organization of African Unity, does it not seem reasonable that, time permitting, that President Clinton could make a visit to the appropriate area of Africa and invite the various governments of the various countries under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity, to attend—and they would. And if nothing more, we would send an extraordinary signal that this country is not about the business of marginalizing Africa, as some think we are, and maybe have been, for some substantial period of time.

I run the risk of offending some, with no offense meant. I am going to support whatever foreign aid that is reasonable and practical for our country for Russia and the Ukraine, or for whatever efforts we undertake in the Middle East and Europe. The same for Africa, through either IMF or the World Monetary Fund, and whatever other aid that comes across our desks.

Having said that, I believe that just from the standpoint of natural resources, that Africa would rival Russia on any given day as a continent, for the resources that are available, once developed, in terms of the infrastructure, in terms of the potential for trade. And it would seem to me that we would look at it from that standpoint, and begin to do those things that are within the boundaries of sovereignty and our understandings that would permit us to do that. I would encourage that we take those things into consideration.

And Mr. Chairman, I have but one question, and I really would urge that you ask President Clinton to use his good offices to send this signal. I think it would be a tremendous bane to Africa's survival. It would be an opportunity to discuss the impending diseases that are extant there, from a standpoint of overall health. It would be an opportunity to talk about what I believe are likely to be hunger problems that are going to rival Somalia, and maybe even make Somalia look like a picnic, within the next 2 or 3 years.

Specifically, though, gentlemen—and this is the only question that I have, Mr. Chairman—what roles have we as a government played and continued to play in mediation efforts in Angola, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Liberia, and Mozambique? And if you can do that in 3 minutes, I would appreciate it.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Just one question.

Mr. COHEN. Well, Mr. Hastings, in Angola the civil war came back again because UNITA failed to live up to its commitments to abide by the election. We are not giving up on it. We are actively engaged in mediation efforts. The interagency administration team was just in Abidjan talking to a UNITA group.

I think we have talked them into a package that could be used as a basis for negotiations. The government is now considering that package. I hope they accept it, and that we can get back to the table around mid April. And the first order of business should be a cease-fire. And get back to the original agreements that they signed in Lisbon 2 years ago.

So we are very active in that. And I think the Americans continue to have credibility with both sides there.

As Mr. Woods pointed out, regarding Rwanda, we have provided technical assistance, both on the diplomatic side and on the military side. We have been very active. I think to the extent that they now have a cease-fire and they are about 90 percent of the way toward a final agreement—I think the Americans could take a lot of credit for that. This is not so much due to our high-level diplomacy as it is to our lower-level technical work, which is so valuable in this type of negotiation.

Regarding Ethiopia, we did not bring about peace in Ethiopia. One side won the war in Ethiopia; that is what caused peace to come. But I think we played a role in bringing it to a soft landing. I think we played a very important role in avoiding the destruction of the city of Addis. And we helped the new government—which is

a promising democracy off to a start—in getting rid of the old Stalinist methods that were used by the Mengistu regime, and in bringing back market economics.

So I think Ethiopia is far from perfect, but it is off to a good start. And we are using the credibility that we earned as mediators to help move them along toward democracy. I think we have more influence there than anyone else. And also, Ethiopia is helping us in Somalia. Ethiopian negotiators in Somalia are doing some magnificent work in bringing about a climate of national reconciliation climate down there.

I forgot the other countries you mentioned.

Mr. HASTINGS. Liberia and Mozambique.

Mr. COHEN. Mozambique is now under a U.N. regime, and I am hoping we will not make the same mistakes in Mozambique that we made in Angola. There will be a much larger U.N. presence. The U.N. will act as a referee, and the U.N. will do a lot more than they did in Angola. And I think there is a good chance for reconciliation in Mozambique.

We are serving on all the international committees, military/civilian, that they have to foster peace and reconciliation there. And I think we will continue to play a major role.

On Liberia, there we have got to give a tremendous amount of credit to the West Africans, especially to the Nigerians, who spent a lot of their own money bringing about peace there, and are slowly creating the stage for a democratic process. We have provided about \$25 million of assistance. It is modest, but I think we have made a difference in Liberia.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I just have one other suggestion. And that is that debt relief for some of those countries would be of immense importance.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Good point, Mr. Hastings. Mr. Woods, since I have chaired this committee, any time I talk to African academicians or Africanists, the first question they always hit me with is, "Why is the U.S. Department of Defense still plowing \$1 billion into an air base in Botswana?" Once and for all, would you dispel that for me? I know I am leading you, but help me out, would you?

[The information referred to follows:]

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, DC, April 9, 1993.

The Honorable Harry Johnston,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE JOHNSTON: At the March 31 hearing on peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa we discussed briefly the new air base in Botswana. Let me add a few details to my testimony on this point. Six years ago, the government of Botswana decided to build a new air base 100 kilometers west of Gaborone, at Molepolole, when it became clear that military operations from the old airfield, now surrounded by houses and the University of Botswana, were no longer safe. The Botswana Government also decided, for its own reasons, not to co-locate military and civilian operations at Gaborone International Airport, despite the cost of constructing an entirely new base.

The United States was not asked to provide advice, assistance, or funding for the new base. The base is being built by a French construction company with the assistance of South African sub-contractors. Equipment for the base is being provided through public tenders. Private U.S. companies have been encouraged to compete for the provision of supplies and systems. At least one U.S. company—Westing-

house—has won a major tender providing an area surveillance radar system, and other companies may be successful in the future.

In sum, the U.S. Government has not been involved in this air base project, nor do we expect to be.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES L. WOODS,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for African Affairs.

Mr. WOODS. Mm-hmm. Well, that came up again about 2 days ago.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK, good. I am glad that I am not the only one that is hit with it.

Mr. WOODS. Every time I talk to my Namibian friends. I tell them it is almost finished. [Laughter.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Please strike that from the record. [Laughter.]

Mr. WOODS. We have zero—

Mr. JOHNSTON. That is all I need.

Mr. WOODS. We have zero involvement. We did not even get a contract. So it is their air base. We were not involved in designing it, suggesting it, or building it.

The question is asked, do we have any plans to use it? The answer is no. The question is then asked, would we ever use it? And the answer is, if they build it and finish it and open it up to outside traffic, we probably will. But we have no plans to do that. It would be just another air base in Africa, as far as we are concerned.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I am sorry. Now, who provided the money for it?

Mr. WOODS. They provided their own money. Who are the main contractors? The French have a piece of it.

Mr. COHEN. They are a very wealthy country. We got the radar contract, Westinghouse.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK.

Mr. WOODS. A number of foreign—

Mr. JOHNSTON. I am sorry I brought this up, now that I think about it. [Laughter.]

Mr. Cohen, do you think it would be helpful for Congress to provide a legislative mandate to the executive branch concerning U.S. involvement and limited military participation as cease-fire monitors in Africa?

Mr. COHEN. I believe, Congressman, that, to the best of my knowledge, such a mandate is not required. We do provide people to U.N. cease-fire monitoring teams in many countries of the world, including Africa.

I think where the Congress may want to take a good look is the 1,000-man maximum under the U.N. Participation Act. And I believe that we are almost at that maximum, with so many different peacekeeping operations around the world. So if you want to send—for example, Mr. Woods has talked about the possibility of sending a battalion, an engineering battalion to Mozambique, then we would be way above the legal ceiling. So I think that is something that should be looked at.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Well, along these same lines, how would you structure a rapid-response mechanism for U.S. involvement?

Mr. COHEN. Well, the Secretary General would like various countries in the world to identify certain units that he could call upon in emergency situations for rapid reaction. Frankly, I do not know

how we would structure our contribution, or whether we would even want to be part of that. That is something that is part of the interagency decisionmaking process now.

Mr. WOODS. The joint staff, of course, is particularly concerned with those kinds of recommendations, which would basically earmark or commit standing forces. Sort of have them on the shelf and on call. And we are not prepared at the moment to go that far.

I would point out that, as the dialogue with the U.N. developed and the staff discussions continued—and common sense, for that matter, applies—if you do not have good intelligence or information, and therefore early warning, and know what is going on; if you do not have adequately sized and competent staff to do the planning and make the preparations; and if you do not have the supporting transportation and all the other elements of the support base; there is not much point in having troops standing by, anyway, because you cannot mount an effective operation.

And those considerations led, of course, to the United States going in basically on its own in Somalia, because we are the only large force or country that is able to put that kind of force together and move it sort of immediately.

So there are a lot of preparatory steps that can be made to strengthen staffs, develop information and intelligence, and a lot of other things short of committing troops on an on-call basis. That is not to say that the joint staff is not going to continue to look at that question. I think that will be one where the administration and the Congress will want to look most closely, just as the command relationship. You will be looking, I am sure, very closely at that aspect, as well.

Mr. JOHNSTON. We have finished our first hour and our first panel. Any other questions before we call the second panel?

Thank you very much. And again, Mr. Cohen, we wish you well.

Mr. COHEN. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSTON. We are going to have about a 3-minute recess in hopes of getting hold of the thermostat.

[Recess.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. I would suggest you grab a chair. If I could ask that possibly they close the door when they get everybody in.

Panel number two is very distinguished, as was panel number one. Professor I. William Zartman, who is Professor of International Organization and Conflict Resolution at Johns-Hopkins; Ms. Vivian Derryck, who is the President of the African-American Institute; and Dr. Chester Crocker, Distinguished Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

This morning we had a seminar in which Professor Zartman was the moderator this morning. He runs a very, very tight ship, and people are given 10 minutes to speak, and at 10 minutes they stop speaking, which was rather unique.

In that regard, Professor, I notice that you have a 20-page opening statement. [Laughter.]

And I will just ask if you might paraphrase 18 of those pages. Professor Zartman.

**STATEMENT OF I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, JACOB BLAUSTEIN
PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND CON-
FLICT RESOLUTION, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY**

Mr. ZARTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for your effort today of bringing attention to conflict management in Africa. I want to put your mind at rest immediately; I will not be going through much of the paper that I have written.

But I wanted to focus on the five policy proposals, as you had asked for, and add one more that might be of use in focusing on effective positive, precise ways of dealing with conflict resolution. Two of them have to do with policy stances, and then four others about particular action.

The first one has to do with democracy. Democracy is a process, not a state of perfection; and its meaning is philosophical, as well as operational. African societies are caught up in the wave of democratization, and incumbent rulers do their best to retain control in the storm.

Democracy is not measured merely by free and fair elections, or even by fairly contested elections, any more than it depends on alternates or on throwing the incumbents out.

Democracy is government carried out by democrats, by politicians committed to a respect of society's right freely to choose and freely to repent its previous choice without punishment. Democratization is a learning process, a process of improvement over past practices, not simply a matter of being democratic or not.

The United States, my first suggestion, needs to be clearer in its statements and explanations about democracy and democratization, providing both inspirational and operational guidance for African states seeking consummation of their struggle for national self-determination. Explaining the subtleties of democracy and the gradual process of democratization is no easy task. And African opinion, ever suspicious and too prone to conspiracy explanations, is quick to see in democratization the political equivalent of structural adjustment and imposition from the outside.

Democracy needs to be related to Africans' concerns and practices, and championed more comprehensively in American official statements. Electoral confrontations that transform violent conflicts into political contests should be seen as establishing the proportions of support for a power-sharing arrangement, however delegate, and not as a winner-takes-all decision leaving a wounded tiger at loose.

Second of all, it seems to me that there is a wave of misplaced pragmatism that is sweeping the official world about African states' unity these days. We are in danger of forgetting our own experiences and values, and forgetting the Africans' lessons of Katanga and Biafra, and of condoning the break-up of African states just as they are coming to terms with their own problems.

We are forgetting that Balkanization always has been a bad word in the African lexicon, and for good reason. It is when norms and principles are under attack that they need reaffirming and defense. Eritrea has dealt a blow to the notion of African unity, that we should be clear that the line still holds elsewhere in Africa.

Third, the third relates to a larger area than Africa, but with the reference to Africa, as well. The Somalia experience with potential

calls from Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, and Zaire, show that African state is in the process of collapse. They need emergency assistance in reestablishing their civil structures after the work of the peacekeeping force has been accomplished. Military forces are needed to restore security so that government and society can function again. That the ravages of conflict frequently mean that the mechanisms of civil society and administration are also destroyed.

Emergency stopgap measures are needed to provide for ready assistance. Yet the need poses all the problems of stand-by military intervention forces.

An appropriate answer comes in the form of reserve units of blue hats, training as weekend administrators, and ready for seconding when the call is issued by the U.N. Security Council, just as a military reserve unit, including military government units, are available for call-up when U.S. forces are required for military operations or in some other countries, when assignments for U.N. blue helmets are issued.

Blue hats' functions include peace, health and hospital posts and telecommunications, local government, and other types of administration. They could be organized as part of the military reserves or national guard, under the Defense Department, or as a new venture, under State Department's aegis. The Inspector's Corps of the United Nations is currently working on a similar type of proposal.

Fourth. The regional organizations, both the OAU and the subregional organizations, in Africa are chronically in arrears. And yet the United States, as well as African countries, depend very heavily on their help.

It would be useful for the United States to consider financial assistance to African regional organizations through direct budgetary support or staff. The United States currently has given some support for OAU operations, as we have heard from Secretary Cohen's testimony, under an understandable reasoning that it holds current accounts to be members' responsibility and special operations eligible for external support.

But as in any organization, it is frequently more difficult to find funding for permanent staff than for highly visible special operations. Special controls would have to be instituted to ensure economical expenditures, as with any foreign aid effort.

Fifth. Very few Africans study, analyze, teach, or write on the various aspects of conflict management, reduction, resolution, or prevention. There is no ready context for thinking about ways of reducing conflicts among African states, and no ready community of support for policies for handling conflict across borders in Africa. African statesmen have been creative and active, but without any organized back-up for their work.

More broadly, African societies almost universally lack a public forum for the discussion of foreign issues. Such conditions are signs of a developed society, but they can also be part of the development process, and need not await a higher stage of development to be instituted. Both types of institutions can be fostered by the United States, possibly with the help of other interesting countries.

It would be useful to promote the constitution of a group of African experts from inside and outside government service, to meet regularly with American and other specialists in conflict manage-

ment, to develop a common language and a sense of community in support of such practices throughout the continent.

Similarly, the development of public fora for discussion of foreign and especially inter-African relations among civic leaders in and out of government is a basic requirement for an informed democracy. Not a luxury of development or an elite club.

African countries need their own councils of foreign relations to raise awareness and promote free discussion. The council, based in New York, could be instrumental in helping African countries create their own bodies, if given appropriate support.

And finally, boundaries constitute a major cause of African conflicts. While the frequent judgment holds that African boundaries are artificial, they are no more so than any other boundaries anywhere. It is the drawing of lines through the human community that is artificial, and no boundaries anywhere coincide neatly with ethnic, geographic, social, or economic divides.

Africa's problem is that its boundaries are recent, and therefore need to be Africanized—that is, to be made part of the life and history of individual African countries and societies. If this is not done by the time-honored ways of war, it must be done by equally established means of diplomacy.

One major technical weakness of African boundaries that bears a comparatively easy solution is the fact that most, that although most are delimited—that is, they are defined on the map; many are not demarcated—that is, they are not defined on the ground.

Outside powers, no matter how well intentioned, cannot push African states to demarcate their boundaries. But they can provide technical assistance and training in the work of boundary demarcation as a way of enabling African states to pursue the Africanization of their own boundaries. Any American program for this activity would be a specific contribution to the prevention of conflict.

The causes of conflict in Africa remain, and its incidence can be expected to rise, I think, in the coming decade. The continent needs to improve its mechanisms for dealing with rising conflict, lest the impending changes in norms on boundaries, noninterference, state integrity and governance, added to continuing structural rivalries within the continent, tear it apart. A frank look at the OAU and its proposed parallel structure, the CSSDCA that we discussed this morning, plus increased attention to subregional mechanisms for conflict management is needed.

The front line for conflict management, however, is conflict prevention through defended norms, demarcated boundaries, respect for and noninterference in democracy, and active diplomacy.

I hope these suggestions might be useful in furthering your purposes.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zartman appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Zartman. Vivian Derryck asked some very probing questions this morning.

**STATEMENT OF VIVIAN LOWERY DERRYCK, PRESIDENT,
AFRICAN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE**

Ms. DERRYCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for arranging these hearings. They have been extremely useful, and have made me, at least, rethink what it is that we would propose.

It has been almost 2 years to the day since I first testified about conflict resolution under the chairmanship then of Congressman Dymally. It was a priority then, and it is a priority now. And as we are meeting today, there are currently 14 conflicts that are going, ongoing in Africa. So this is something important for us to discuss.

But even as we look at those 14 conflicts, we can see that there has been some progress within the past 2 years. And Africans are now working on this issue.

In May 1991, the Kampala Forum gathered more than 500 Africans who discussed popular participation in the expansion of pluralism.

Mr. HASTINGS. Can you pull the mike, Ms. Derryck? Please pardon me for interrupting. Thanks.

Ms. DERRYCK. The notion of an African version of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe was raised by General Olusegun Obasanjo, the former head of state of Nigeria and current president of the Africa Leadership Forum. He and colleagues there proposed a conference on security, stability, cooperation, and development in Africa, which we have discussed this morning.

And in 1992, in April, the Council of Elders was inaugurated at Arusha, and has been involved in some conflict mediation since. For instance, South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu went to Cameroon immediately after the October elections. And General Obasanjo has been a tireless advocate for a regional mechanism which would address these African issues.

He has observed elections in various countries, most notably in Angola, where his voice was a very strong one in talking about the fact that the elections were sorely needed there.

In other positive developments, there is a new OAU acknowledgement of the primacy of conflict resolution. Again, we talked about this this morning.

Under the auspices of the African-American Institute, when Secretary General Salim Salim visited Washington he discussed these changes that are occurring on the continent. And he also talked very specifically about the understanding among members states that the continuing conflicts are sapping Africa of much-needed development dollars. That is really something we have not stressed a lot here. But it has become very clear that every dollar that is involved in conflict resolution is a dollar that cannot be used for sectoral development.

He also talked about the fact that conflicts are harming Africa's image as a potential site for new investment. And in a sea change, the OAU Council of Ministers is considering that a mediation and conflict resolution unit be established, either with line reporting to the OAU assembly of heads of state, or to the OAU Commission on Mediation. This is a sea change that we have seen in the past 2 years.

Traditionally, diplomats and others have talked about two phases of conflict resolution. But now we see people talking about four stages of conflict resolution. Again, the discussion of preventive diplomacy that we had this morning is very, very useful. But we have not seen, we would not have seen that 2 years ago.

Also, the Secretary General has raised the concept of post-conflict reconstruction and post-conflict peace building. We call that a consolidation phase, but it is the same principle. That we cannot, as the United States, simply leave after a democratically elected government takes place, and then say that this is the end of our responsibility and our involvement. It is awfully important to be involved in the institution-building phase, and building institutions that help support alternative mechanisms to conflict mediation besides war.

Mr. Chairman, I think that there are four lessons that we have seen through the AAI optic. First, observers have a new appreciation of the extent to which sovereignty has been an obstacle to conflict resolution in Africa. When many of us were encouraging U.N. involvement in Liberia, we were told by African and Western diplomats that sovereignty was an inviolate principle.

Similarly, when we suggested that in Somalia the magnitude of human suffering demanded action, initially the sovereignty principle was a Damocles' sword preventing action. The ECOMOG intervention in Liberia is a dramatic and appropriate break with a concept that has outlived its usefulness in civilian strife situations where human suffering reaches a wide-scale peak.

The second lesson that we have seen has taught us that while ideology is no longer a driving force, other deep-seated animosities can just as easily conflagrate civil wars. Formerly in Burundi and currently in Rwanda, we have witnessed the deep schisms that divide people. Resolving conflicts is just as intractable, if not more so, than the deep-seated animosities of ethnic stereotypes and racial and religious prejudice are at work.

Third, Africa, though marginalized, is still an integral part of an interdependent planet. And techniques and strategies of conflict resolution that have worked in other areas of the world may have applicability in Africa, and vice-versa.

Fourth, we have learned that in Africa, the military is pivotal in all phases of conflict resolution. Again, as we began to discuss this morning, the military can foment or moderate preventive diplomacy; it can thwart or support peacekeeping; and it can certainly interrupt the process of peace making. And we certainly had a vivid example of that this morning when General Alorin discussed with us what was happening in Nigeria under ECOMOG.

The military is also a key factor in reconciliation and reconstruction and peace building. And as we have been discussing today, I have also been struck by how important we NGO's are.

NGO's are on the ground. We can provide an early warning signal. We can help strengthen civil institutions, and help provide alternate mechanisms that are useful in conflict resolution.

All of this, Mr. Chairman, these five lessons from the past 2 years, have led us at AAI to renew our commitment to the establishment of an African institution that can deal with these issues.

In August 1991, AAI submitted an unsolicited proposal to establish a center for conflict resolution in Africa. That was a good idea then, and it is a good idea now.

Mr. JOHNSTON. You were ahead of your time.

Ms. DERRYCK. Hopefully this time, as we resubmit it, it will get some further discussion.

Africa would benefit from a center devoted exclusively to conflict resolution that is located on the continent. Currently, as Bill Zartman just said and others this morning, there is nowhere on the continent a place that monitors conflict resolution, conflicts, and potential conflicts, that alerts Africans of the dangers and offers an impartial meeting ground to participants, either in an armed conflict or in a minor crisis, so that they can meet with mediation leaders and conflict resolution specialists.

This center would be organized with a board of 12 to 15 governors comprised of senior Africans and internationalists knowledgeable about Africa and its conflicts, and a group of senior professionals based in Africa. A small two-person secretariat in the United States would coordinate U.S. input.

When we originally submitted this, we talked about a likely site as being Cameroon, which is bilingual, centrally placed, had good transport and good communication facilities. And it is really a testament to what happens in Africa that 2 years later, obviously Cameroon would not be an option. So we have come to a new idea in talking about doing in both in Benin to celebrate a new democracy that seems to be in place and thriving, and Botswana, a mature democracy on the continent.

Policy direction of the center would be guided primarily by the nonresident predominantly African governors—eminent persons who could commit themselves to active involvement in the settlement of disputes, and who are knowledgeable about African political situation, where they know where tensions exist; they have had extensive experience in governments, and they know the multilateral community, as well. And as elders—this is so important—these persons are likely to be acceptable to the population.

Again, it was a point that I think Felix Mosha made this morning, it is fine to have mediators and negotiators; but if they are not acceptable to the African population at that level below the government level, below the combatants, then you are really not involving the population that has to ultimately ratify whatever solution is achieved.

The center would be African-based and run on a day-to-day basis by this 14-person secretariat. The center would be independent of both the OAU and the U.N. And that is in order to preserve its effectiveness and to insulate it from organizational pressures and influence.

However, informal exchanges and associations with such organizations would be desirable and to be encouraged.

The OAU, which is the principal African organization with a mandate to act on a resolution of African conflicts, is bound by its own principle of noninterference in the affairs of member states. And while Liberia and Somalia are exceptions, there is really no discernible move among African states and heads of government to modify this principle of sovereignty in terms of state-to-state rela-

tions. And it, therefore, will remain difficult to gain consensus or permission to intervene in conflict situations without an invitation from the government and a question.

The center's leadership would collaborate with the OAU and the U.N. with governmental and nongovernmental institutions that seek to integrate democracy and development to cooperate with human rights and refugee groups currently active at the site of conflicts, and build on the experience of other centers and institutions that are active in the study and resolution of conflicts.

And again, Dr. Zartman is correct. There are not very many of those institutions in Africa, although the Nigerian center may be a welcome exception to that rule. But there are in other places in the world. And it is important to try to build on the experience and positive experiences of others in a center like this.

Four major forms of conflict seem to dominate Africa: ethnic-, racial-, and religious-based conflicts; ideologically based conflicts, which pit contrasting views of governance in economic organization against each other; boundary-based conflicts, which result from disputes over boundaries drawn at independent land ownership and property rights; and internationally fomented conflicts that are prompted by external factors.

The proposed center would address the different types of conflict by providing three basic services. First, it would collect, analyze, and share data on conflicts in Africa. Second, it would foster solutions to conflict through mediation services. And third, provide follow-up services to aid in the implementation of any agreed-upon resolution.

The center would have a two-pronged mandate, including both research and action. Research would call upon existing African resources and scholars. In the action aspect of the proposed center's mandate, work would concentrate on sending members of the board of governors and other senior professional staff to negotiate conflicts and work with African militaries in establishing an intraAfrican conflict resolution mechanism.

Mr. Chairman, you asked for specifics. And I can be specific in terms particularly of funding. If Africans are to be fully invested, they have to have a financial stake in the process, in the process of establishing a center such as the one that we are proposing.

Here the concept of matched co-funding is appropriate. I would propose a U.S. startup grant, matched by African contributions from ministries of foreign affairs, and by NGO's that wanted affiliated status with the center. The Association of African Universities could contribute a fellow each year. The African Academy of Sciences could nominate a person. Those two fellows could be paid by an AID grant administered by either the organization or a U.S.-based PVO.

The United Nations could also contribute to the center, without infringing on the center's autonomy. The U.N. is an active player in conflict resolution activities in Africa, and currently has operations in Angola, Somalia, Western Sahara, and a special envoy to Liberia. There are persons in South Africa, and we do not know what is going to happen. And I left out Mozambique. So the point is, it is obvious.

Over time, the concept of the center and the success of its work—

Mr. JOHNSTON. Ms. Derryck, you need to wrap it up, if you do not mind.

Ms. DERRYCK. OK. Will hopefully attract the attention of other donor organizations. Aid reorganization is focusing on five areas, and one of them is peacekeeping and peace making.

The creation of such a center would fit neatly into the DFA, and demonstrate U.S. commitment to concrete help for this endeavor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Derryck appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much. Introducing Mr. Crocker, who is not only the Distinguished Professor of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, he is also the predecessor of Secretary Cohen, and his reputation precedes him.

Mr. Crocker.

STATEMENT OF CHESTER A. CROCKER, DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF DIPLOMACY, SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You have organized a very impressive day of discussion. And as the last speaker, I do not want to try and recap or hit all the points, or resummairize what you have done. I do want to applaud your initiative in the scheduling of these deliberations.

I think it is worth underscoring the extent to which there is, to use a term I have used elsewhere, a global security deficit around the world. And Africa is part of that. But the African problem of conflict and of challenges to peace making and peacekeeping is not a uniquely African problem; it is a global problem.

I am talking about an absence of agreed principles. I am talking about an absence of sufficient institutional capabilities. I am talking about an absence, in some cases, of hard money resources to carry out the mandates that are agreed by peacemakers and mediators. I am talking about U.N. peacekeeping funding, and a whole series of basic issues of capability which are simply in short supply. So I want to put Africa in a global context.

Secondly, I want to touch on some of the obvious points about the African security deficit. We see countries, as has been mentioned, where there is an excess of often light armaments, but too many arms, both in the hands of official forces and in the hands of society at large. It is essential to get the genie back inside the bottle, without focusing undue attention on how it got out in the first place, which is a long subject of discussion.

There have got to be ways that we can contribute, Mr. Chairman, to that issue of how we get demobilization, how we get retraining of forces, how we get weapons collected and destroyed. We have got to begin seriously to address making a dent on the problem. And I am convinced that our country can play a role in that effort. We already are, in a few cases, selectively. We could certainly be doing more.

We focus a lot on the cost of peacekeeping, and it is vital that we do focus on it, because it is a big budget item. It is essential

that we not be laggards in this effort, on a worldwide basis, including in Africa.

We focus less attention on the costs and the requirements, the resources, for peace making. I think it is sometimes imagined that the peacemaker is an individual who flies around the world in airplanes, and goes to meetings, and comes home again, supported by a bureaucracy which does its normal, everyday work.

In practice, serious mediation and peacemaking is a full-time commitment, not for one person, but for a task force of people; for an entire mini-bureaucracy. It is essential, if Africa is to be empowered—and I hope that it is being empowered gradually—to make its own peace, and not rely on outsiders to make peace, that there be such capacities built. That there be task forces, either in individual African governments which take a lead, or in the OAU secretariat, or within the subregional kinds of organizations that have been referred to in the case of West Africa, for example.

And that calls for real dedicated resources, trained people, and adequate budget and staff support.

Another thing that is in deficit, obviously, if you look around the world, in terms of peace making, is the political will to make peace. And that requires the kind of leverage, the kind of clout, the kind of influence and symbolic authority which often, at the present state of affairs in Africa, has to be borrowed from the world community, from big powers like ourselves, as well as from the U.N.

I can imagine no higher calling in our African policies than to hone, to perfect, and to sustain our U.S. commitment and our contributions to the process of peacemaking.

Let me add that all too often what happens, or what seems to happen—and you find examples in every region, again. In Central America, in Bosnia, in Cambodia or in Angola—what happens is that we sign agreements, and we think the job is done. That is when the job begins.

I am referring to the job of implementation. The job of enforcement. The job of keeping a peace process and a settlement on the track is a fundamental requirement. So we simply have to support that function.

There are some hopeful trends, as has been mentioned by previous witnesses. We do see, I think, important progress within the OAU secretariat, with the leadership of the Secretary General, Salim Salim. We see some beginnings in the form of ECOMOG in Liberia. This is a watershed; it is an important watershed.

We see, I think, an unprecedented number of African units participating worldwide in U.N. peacekeeping. And that is important. Because since African conflicts form an important part of the conflict agenda worldwide, it is appropriate that the pool of peacekeepers include Africans, as well as soldiers from other continents and other regions.

Now, you asked for specifics. I have a few suggested guidelines, if you will. I believe strongly that we should not try to do everything. We should select some targets. We should try to make a difference selectively. There is a huge menu of possible things we, in the United States, through the public and the private and non-government sectors, could be doing. But let's try and concentrate our efforts. Let's have some division of effort. That might be

worked out in conjunction with our friends and partners in Africa, and also with our key industrial allies, who can be doing the same thing.

I would like to see this issue on the G-7 summit agenda, for example. I think that is where it rightfully belongs.

Second, I do not think we should confine ourselves to one forum or institution within Africa to support. To assume that everything that is going to happen in terms of capacity building in Africa will be at the OAU level I think is stretching it. I do not think we know yet. It is early days. We should be supporting a variety of institutions that are African institutions. We should be supporting African initiatives.

Thirdly, as I have said in different ways, African problems are global problems, and we must admit that many of the solutions that we are groping for will come through the strengthening of U.N. mechanisms. If the U.N. is more able to do its job on a worldwide basis, it will help directly in Africa. So let's again put the thing in a global context.

Fourthly, it is unacceptable to permit the financial tail to wag the foreign policy dog on peace making and peacekeeping. We simply must get our arrearages caught up. And I do not care whether it is funded out of State Department accounts or out of DOD; I am not a partisan for which it is. But it is unacceptable for this country to be in arrearages on peacekeeping.

Another suggestion that I have is that as we think through the funding, that we should separate out peacekeeping operational matters, which tend to be fairly large-ticket items, from what I would call peace-making, peacekeeping training and institution-building types of initiatives of the sort that Vivian Derryck and Bill Zartman have already referred to in their remarks. And I am not a partisan for any particular formula. But we must segregate, I think, those two different kinds of activities.

What would be very useful is for there to be more signals from the Congress, in my view, to the Executive, that there is support for some degree of security assistance funding to strengthen our ability to support activities within the OAU or within ECOMOG or whatever institutions relevant. I would like to see a line item, is what I am saying, provided it is not at the expense of something else. Earmarking always has that potential downside, I am aware of that.

But it seems to me the Executive should be encouraged to do what it has just begun to do, which is to support relevant African initiatives through our security assistance programs.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Excuse me. Mr. Crocker, could you give me a memo on that? Just a one-paragraph memo on what you just said?

Mr. CROCKER. I would be happy to.

Mr. JOHNSTON. You may go ahead.

Mr. CROCKER. Two final suggestions. It has been suggested that Africa is short of institutions like the Council in Foreign Relations, foreign policy institutions. I agree with that.

African peacemakers and peacekeepers at the institutional level are also short of information and intelligence of the sort that policymakers in any governmental structure require. This should not

surprise us. The U.N. itself is short of information and intelligence when it comes to what is going on on the ground.

I know it is a sensitive matter; perhaps it is not a matter we can pursue in great detail in a public hearing. There has got to be a way for our government to support the requirements of peace-makers and peacekeepers through the timely sharing of information, let's put it that way, that is relevant, relevant to the situations on the ground. It is unacceptable to have people trying to do their job of making peace if they do not know as much as the parties themselves, who often are manipulating the peacemaker. So it is a sensitive point, but I feel it needs to be mentioned.

And one final one, Mr. Chairman. African military forces obviously vary enormously, and it is hard to generalize about them. They tend, in the main, to possess infantry, light-armor or light-artillery units, with little capacity for self-sufficiency under operational circumstances. What is required for there to be an African peacekeeping capability that is really indigenous is some greater degree of self-sufficiency, of logistic and maintenance and support capabilities under operational circumstances.

This, it seems to me, could be a target of our own security assistance. It could be a target, not only of ours, but of others, in looking at how to expand the pool of effective peacekeepers and peace enforcers in Africa. You cannot field a battalion if you cannot feed it, if you cannot equip it, if you cannot clothe it. And this has all too often been a very concrete handicap or obstacle to effectiveness on the ground.

So those, I guess, Mr. Chairman, are my comments. Some of these activities I have touched upon have already begun; others could be started, provided they are welcomed by our African partners. I think the road is open for us to be innovative and creative.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crocker appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Edwards.

Mr. EDWARDS. No question, thank you.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Payne? I have a series of questions that I am going to ask when I come back after voting, so that is why I am being so magnanimous here.

Mr. PAYNE. I was wondering what was wrong. [Laughter.]

Just about the crisis in Zaire. Of course, you have a great deal of knowledge about Zaire and Mr. Mobutu. How would you go about trying to sort out that situation as it currently is today?

Mr. CROCKER. How would I go about it? Are you addressing me, Mr. Payne?

Mr. PAYNE. Yes.

Mr. CROCKER. Well, there have been windows that have been available at various times to do something. I think we are witnessing a very sad spectacle, a rather tragic dance, actually, among various players.

There are a great many people involved in the politics of Zaire. It is not one man, or just the military.

I do not believe that massive intervention is in the cards. I do not think there is support for it. I do not think that anyone is calling for it at this point. And yet occasionally you read that we need

some kind of miracle, some *deus ex machina* to come in and save the situation.

We should be and we are supporting the national conference procedure. That makes a lot of sense. We are making it, I think, very clear to Mobutu that we do not support his continued monopoly of power.

I do not think that we are going to get very far if we advertise that our basic approach is to figure out how we are going to string these guys up once they leave office. I think the purpose would be to figure out how we could get some kind of a transition that provides something for everybody. That may not be terribly popular, but I think that is the way it is going to have to happen. Otherwise the worst could happen, which is that it goes on and on, this gradual slide of the Zaire economy down to nothing, it goes on and on. We cannot afford to see that. The Zairian people cannot afford to see it.

We are working, as you know, with some key partners, historical partners of Zaire, in the form of Belgium and France. That is important. If there is any thinking coming from the neighboring countries, from the OAU, that should be factored in. I have not seen a whole lot of initiatives in that regard, but it certainly should be factored in.

So those are a few initial ideas. But we need to get a transition with some dates, some benchmarks, some assurances for all the key players.

Mr. PAYNE. Of course, that is what we have been doing. We have been supporting the conference. We have been, you know, urging Mr. Mobutu to cooperate. And things have simply gotten progressively worse. So it just appears to me that, you know, although I am asking your opinion, that evidently that is failing.

And although you appear to have a reluctance for, as you said, there to be anything more heavy, so to speak, this thing could, with that approach, could go on simply indefinitely. Because I do not see Mr. Mobutu changing if there is no real reason to change, no real pressure.

Mr. CROCKER. Well, Mr. Payne, I am looking for the pressure points, too. I mean, conflict resolution is about leverage, if I can steal a phrase from my colleague here who I think was the first one to use it. And you need that. You need leverage. People talk about visas and about seizing bank accounts and denying access for foreign travel, and what-have-you.

Zaire is already substantially cutoff from the world community. One of the ways this guy stays in power so long is by the fact that you cannot communicate with Zairians very easily from this country or other countries outside. The phones do not work sometimes, when it is convenient. So I am not sure that cutting off everything is the way to go.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Excuse me for interrupting. We have to go vote. If I could impose upon you I will be back in 11 minutes, and if you could stay for 10 minutes longer after that; I promise to release you by quarter of 5. We were scheduled to finish at 4:30. So we will stand in recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. I would ask everybody to please have a seat. Mr. Payne is also going to return shortly.

Ms. DERRYCK, I may have missed this in your testimony. This conflict resolution organization that you have very creatively visualized, will that be under the umbrella of the OAU?

Ms. DERRYCK. No.

Mr. JOHNSTON. It will be a separate organization?

Ms. DERRYCK. It would be a separate organization, Mr. Chairman. We have discussed this a lot, and with officials of the OAU as well. But there is a need for more than one approach to African conflict resolution. And I think that we have established today that there really is a need in the private civilian sector to have organizations that allow Africans to come together to discuss these issues and to talk about the kind of research and experiences that other continents, other regions, have enjoyed.

And that this center, as we envision it, would be a parallel, a complementary organization to the OAU, and perhaps even have persons seconded to it from the OAU and the U.N.

Mr. JOHNSTON. What other continents? Can you give me an example of a similar type of organization in another geographic area of the world?

Ms. DERRYCK. There are a lot in Europe, and in our proposal we have listed several, in Sweden and places.

Mr. JOHNSTON. All right. You heard Mr. Cohen this morning. And one of his five suggestions was to set up a conflict resolution under the OAU. And I think in part because he said it could be done with about \$1 million a year. You list a budget with everything but a figure.

Ms. DERRYCK. \$936,000.

Mr. JOHNSTON. And 20 cents.? [Laughter.]

Ms. DERRYCK. I do not remember the rest of it. But it is some-odd dollars, \$866 and—

Mr. JOHNSTON. That is right.

Ms. DERRYCK. But the point being that that would be a startup grant, and then look for other sources of funding. But it is important that Africans are invested in the process. And this is something to which there is not significant African commitment and financial contribution. It really does not work if it is something that is imposed from outside.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Crocker, how much are we in arrears now to the United Nations? Approximately.

Mr. CROCKER. I do not feel current on that, Mr. Chairman. I would be guessing. I would say it was probably in the range of \$300 million. It is down substantially from what it was, but it has got a ways to go.

There is a program for becoming current. But I just reflect on some experiences that I have seen where the budget pressure sort of defined the mandate, and that is backwards.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The representative this morning from OAU was mentioning the fact that some of its member nations were in arrears. I am wondering if it would be wise if we looked at those countries that were in arrears to the OAU before we looked at the aid packages to those countries. Or is that punitive? Of course, I realize we are in a glass house to do that.

Mr. ZARTMAN. That may be—I think the point is not to punish, but rather to find out how the money can be brought out. And are we dealing with poorer countries? Are we dealing with countries that have some kind of problem with the OAU? The reasons for arrears can be different from country to country.

What is important, I think, is to get money into the OAU in such a way that the staff can function, and so that it can provide the support.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Because the Secretary General has a very modest, I think, \$16 million a year. I think that was his budget, was it not?

Mr. ZARTMAN. I think it is \$24 million.

Mr. JOHNSTON. \$24 million? It went up.

Mr. ZARTMAN. \$24 million last year. It is \$28 million this year, in fact.

Mr. JOHNSTON. \$28 million, all right.

Mr. ZARTMAN. That is true.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Maybe that is his budget, and maybe his revenues are \$16 million. I am not sure, but whatever it is, relatively speaking, it is very modest.

Ms. DERRYCK. Mr. Chairman, he did say when he visited you that he was operating on a—his operational budget was something less than \$16 million.

Mr. JOHNSTON. That is what it was, yes.

Ms. DERRYCK. And that \$72 million in arrearages now.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Is that right?

Ms. DERRYCK. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I think at the same time I mentioned to him that the interest from Mr. Mobutu's Paris bank accounts could underwrite OAU very easily. [Laughter.]

A little humor there. Very little. [Laughter.]

Mr. Crocker, who was the father of ECOMOG? Was it Nigeria? Who was the creator of it? Was there one individual that took the lead in Western Africa?

Mr. CROCKER. Decision making tends to be pretty much at the top in many governments, including West African governments. And I would have thought it is at pretty senior levels in Nigeria that this got going. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Professor Zartman, you arrive here today with a paper trail, somewhat like Justice Bork, I guess. That was meant to be a compliment. I read from your book, *Conflict Resolutions in Africa*, "Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction, unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions."

Could you interpret what I just read? What did you mean by that, sir?

Mr. ZARTMAN. Well, I mean at least two things, as the rest of the paragraph goes on. First of all, there are important issues that people are willing to fight for.

One of them that we want to run across that gives us trouble in regard to our topic today is the right of self-determination. Communities say, "We want to rule ourselves." And that is the highest political goal that mankind can have for itself. And so people are going to fight for it.

But beyond that, conflict is innate in human interaction. I mean, a very basic kind of thing. Two people want to do different things. We are continually in conflict with each other, as I say, at a very banal, ordinary level.

Very frequently when we talk about conflict resolution, we seem to think that we can exorcise conflict, that we can get rid of it and live in a peaceful world—lion and the lamb, and all that kind of thing. And my point is in this that we have got to learn to live with conflict. That the important thing is to manage it; that is, to reduce the means of violence, and carry conflict into a political arena alone, where people do not kill themselves over their goals. That we have got to learn to bring goals together, rather than hoping that conflict will disappear.

Mr. JOHNSTON. You said also that only time will resolve conflicts. How valid is that in the argument to Africa?

Mr. ZARTMAN. Oh, I think that is very valid. I try to write reasonably valid things. [Laughter.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Well, I meant in the African context.

Mr. ZARTMAN. The point is in this that—again, we focus on conflict resolution, as if we think we can get rid of the conflict. And I think by now that we should know that the first focus should be on managing it, on reducing its violent incidents, and then on looking for ways to handle it, to institutionalize it, to deal with it as it comes up again.

Problems such as, well, say Yugoslavia, which we thought was gone as a problem, remind us that conflict is not resolved; that we need to be alert and ready to handle it. And it takes a long time before it disappears.

Mr. JOHNSTON. You are very strong on this not Balkanizing this country any further.

Mr. ZARTMAN. That is right.

Mr. JOHNSTON. We discussed this earlier today. Your former colleague who was one of the editors of your book, "Conflict in Africa", Mr. Denn, has got an article in this month's *Brookings* publication: "Africa and the New World Disorder: Rethinking Colonial Borders". Mr. Denn is here to defend himself, if he needs to.

Eritrea, let's start with that one. Is partitioning the only solution to peace in this country after 40 years of civil war?

Mr. ZARTMAN. Well, there we are up against the problem that I was talking about, of people fighting for what they consider to be their highest goal. And the authority which held sovereignty over the area before, doing it terribly badly. If that federation between Eritrea which was put into effect under the United Nations in 1952 had held, if the Emperor had not gotten cock-sure and decided after 10 years to dissolve it and then to be imperialist, cultural imperialist within his own country; we may still have a federated unit that would be a much more natural and successful unit.

Now we have an Ethiopia which is landlocked. We have an Ethiopia that has to have good relations with Eritrea in order to get out into the sea. And so we have got the basis for conflict, for ongoing conflict. So be it. This is the way it has been. There has been a war for it, and Eritrea has won. But there are other ways that could have been, by which the conflict could have been handled.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The anomaly is that in meeting with the Eri-
treans, they say their biggest trading partner will now be the Ethi-
opians.

Mr. ZARTMAN. Well, that is true. They have them by the throat.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Going along with a conversation I had with Mr.
Denn about Sudan, you would be very much against the partition
of Northern and Southern Sudan?

Mr. ZARTMAN. The OAU, in its charter in 1963 and then its Cairo
Resolution in 1964, reaffirmed this idea of territorial unity, of in-
herited boundaries. And I think it is important, as in any political
unit, for states to learn to live within themselves.

The problem in Sudan is not that there is some kind of natural
divide; it is very hard to draw a line across Sudan. The problem
is that the government is acting as if part of the territory is its col-
ony. It is a question of bad governance which is driving many Su-
danese now to rethinking this notion of unity to which they held
so long. And I think it is important for us from the outside to help
states live up to their responsibilities as states. To govern their
people, all of their people, wisely; to conduct normal politics and
listen to the grievances of their populations, and not conduct a colo-
nialist policy within their own boundaries.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. I agree with you. I recall when the Biafran situation,
the eastern states in Nigeria, when it was the move to secede in
the late 1960's, that I thought it was a move in the wrong direc-
tion, although the West—and I probably was opposed to it because
the United States and Great Britain were for it.

But just getting back to federations. In South Africa, with the
election coming up and talking to some experts on South Africa,
what form of government would you see coming into play? Do you
think a federation where white militants and former supporters of
the apartheid government, like Buthelezi, and people having a lit-
tle bit of authority in a little canton or state would relatively guar-
antee that it would work more smoothly, or not?

Mr. ZARTMAN. The idea of federation in South Africa is hotly dis-
cussed, is perhaps gaining a little more currency. It used to be a
white, right idea. And I am not sure whether a Federal system, by
that name, is likely to be the solution to peace.

But certainly a devolution of power, with a good deal of local au-
tonomy, within a general structure. But South Africa can only
achieve peace when it gets to be a one-person, one-vote situation,
and where sovereignty returns to the entire population.

So federalism to the point of confederation, as some people dis-
cussed, is not going to be—will not simply bring peace to the situa-
tion.

Mr. PAYNE. Just on that whole question, too, when we look at
Namibia, and maybe Mr. Crocker could answer that, what resolu-
tion do you see about the Walvis Bay situation, where South Africa
is still maintaining that that is a part of South Africa, although it
is in the middle of Namibia? But I guess they say as long as Great
Britain said that Hong Kong was a part of it, it is further away,
or Gibraltar. So they kind of used some examples that are certainly
historical.

Where do you see that situation going?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Payne, I think there are some other examples which the South African Government would, no doubt, point to. There is also a question of legal title, which in a technical way they will use the arguments pointing back to 19th century legal title. When you contrast that with common sense, the requirements of the Namibian economy, I think there is sort of a *modus vivendi* for now on this issue. But I would expect it to get resolved, and to get resolved in terms of the ultimate incorporation of the port into Namibia.

Whether it happens under the transition framework, the transitional executive before the election takes place in South Africa, or whether it happens after such an election, I really could not predict. But I suspect that it will happen. Through a process of dialogue. These two countries need each other. There is an awful lot of interchange and mutual dependence.

Mr. PAYNE. Just finally, on the Zairian situation, you know, it appears to me that there should be a little stronger move by the part of Belgium and France. It is surprising that the French Government would allow Mr. Mobutu to come in to have a tooth repaired, you know, weeks after a French official representative was accidentally killed in that country.

So I question, I wonder whether there is any real strong interest on the part of the French at all. But then even Belgium, it seems to me that there would be a little stronger push to kind of—and also, the United States, I think, should be a third partner in that, but more in the background.

But getting back to the question before about the status quo, it just appears to me that there will be a continuing decline in the situation.

Mr. CROCKER. Oh, I think I agree with you. There are many ways to try and envisage pressure on a government which has its leader fly in for an occasional cap or some bridge work or something. I have often wondered if a *paté* boycott is not what is really called for, to try and restrain a little bit the tastes of some of the elite.

We have to work with these two key countries. And I think they ought to get a signal from us that we are not satisfied with letting this thing, letting nature take its course. That is my bottom line. We should not let people think that we believe nature can take its course.

And with that behind us, we could then envisage a series of steps and measures that would include some American leadership. Perhaps, if we have to, some escalation.

I come to the point that Bill Zartman made about boundaries. It is unacceptable, I think, to African stability, as perceived by Africans, to have Zaire fly into pieces. This is fundamentally destabilizing to all of Central and Southern Africa. It is very dangerous stuff.

Mr. PAYNE. On the question, too, of Angola, what—and maybe any of you might answer—what is your opinion about the lack of recognition by the U.S. Government of the NPLA Dos Santos government, which won the election? It would appear to me that therefore should be recognized as the victor in the election, and therefore may have some effect on the boldness that Mr. Savimbi continues to show.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I might mention that Mr. Payne and I are co-sponsors of a resolution to the State Department and to the administration to recognize the Angolan Government.

Mr. ZARTMAN. Bless you. I think that is important at this time.

Might I also add, might I just pick up the Zairian question as well? I think we need to give a strong, clear signal to President Mobutu that the time is up. In fact, his 2 years after his Presidential term are just about up. And we need to, in collaboration with France and Belgium, which means bringing them along, and other African states, we need to tell them that the end of the mandate is present, and that it is the democracy movement that runs the government.

As long as he is around, even in retirement, the Bagalitey, he is a master at playing politics in that country. He invented the politics of the country as it is played. And the democratic movement is the weaker party.

So keeping him around, keeping him looking for a mediation, as we had an earlier question this morning, a mediation between Mobutu and the democratic movement, chekete is now over, I think. It leaves the democratic movement in a weaker position; yet they are the ones that we want to strengthen. And we need a strong message to him.

Ms. DERRYCK. Mr. Payne, I would want to pick up on the point of Angola. We, too, strongly urge that the U.S. recognize Angola immediately. There is virtual unanimity among our allies who recognized Angola years ago, with the latest being Germany in 1980.

But in addition to recognition, I think that there are some other specific steps that we should take. One, we should urge Mr. Savimbi to attend the Addis Ababa peace talks under the auspices of the OAU. We should tell him that going to Geneva is not acceptable; that he really does need to go and pick up the pieces of those talks there.

Secondly, that the United States should take a lead in the new demobilization effort that has to take place, granted under the U.N.'s auspices, but the United States can take the lead in that. As we know, Mr. Savimbi did not demobilize; neither party did, fully. But Mr. Savimbi was clearly the worse offender in this. And he did not demobilize his forces; his 50,000 troops or whatever is left of them are still there. And we need to take the lead in doing that.

And then if there is going to be a run-off election again, we need to make sure that the proper number of observers are present. And again, the United States has to take I think a leadership role.

And in terms of Zaire, many NGO's feel very strongly that the United States has not been a strong-enough actor here. That we need to be very clear that there are two governments, ostensibly, in Zaire, and we are supporting the one: the Tekeshete government.

We also need to find, identify another country in Africa that will allow Mr. Mobutu to come there and live out his retirement years. And that is extremely important that he sees that he is not going to be pilloried or hanged or whatever, or in any way separated from his resources, or at least enough of them that would allow him to live out his years peacefully.

And thirdly, we should, the United States should be involved in freezing his assets if nothing else works. And that, plus the diplomatic act of not extending visas to either him or his coterie, we think are very, very important steps. The United States has a large, strong responsibility here. We have been supportive of this man. We should not abandon him, as one does with a former ally. But it should be clear that the kind of Zaire that he is talking about continuing to rule is unacceptable in 1993, in the changes that we see in governments and politics.

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Payne, I did not answer your question on Angola. I just wanted to say that it seems to me that since the Government of Angola wants it so bad, it must be worth something. And since Mr. Savimbi wants us not to do it, presumably, it must be worth something on that side, too. So I want to see us use this issue to get the parties to really get sober on the issue of what will have to be called probably UNIVEM III, which is a properly mandated U.N. force that can supervise the next phase of this protracted Angolan transition.

Hindsight is easy. A lot of things might have been done differently. But the problem really was having the U.N. come in when it was not running the operation. The Angolan Government ran the operation. A lot of people violated a lot of things. I do not hold a brief for either of them.

The MPLA has been making a career of waiting for the world to give it things. And Savimbi has been making a career of taking what he can get. It is not a pretty picture, but we have got to use our influence to get them together.

Mr. PAYNE. Incidentally, we also, Mr. Johnston and I have a bill on Zaire, too. He mentioned one on Angola, but we have one also stating just some of the things that you are talking about: freezing assets, insisting and even finally asking the United Nations to consider the need for a peace-making contingent of French and Belgian troops, with perhaps a logistical back-up from the USA. Because we just cannot tolerate and allow a country to just totally disintegrate.

Just a question, Ms. Derryck. I know you recently had a conference in Burundi on this whole question of conflict resolution. Could you just briefly summarize your opinion of it and its outcomes, real quickly?

Ms. DERRYCK. The conference was a meeting that convened military leaders from nine Southern African countries, regional countries. And the point of this was to allow militaries to meet each other and to talk about the role of the military in a democratic country.

We began by talking about the military in nation building. We talked about the military in terms of the military's loyalty to the state, as opposed to a regime. We talked about human rights responsibilities of the military. And we talked also about the cost that demobilization of African armies was now inevitable.

We talked about the need to reduce arms expenditures. We did it in both plenary sessions and in small groups. And the small groups were off the record, so that there was a good opportunity for persons to have interchange.

What we found was that the military leaders from one country to another did not know each other. So it was beneficial for them to have that opportunity to dialogue informally.

We also had some very strong discussions about the second that I mentioned, this liberty versus security, and the need to be loyal to the state, as opposed to an individual. And that was particularly important. And the discussions lasted for quite some time.

Finally, the most compelling thing that happened was the stark chart presented by someone from the World Bank that talked about the costs of these demobilization efforts. In Angola, for instance, the cost is \$635 million, that to be contrasted with what one could do if one had those funds to use for peaceful training, et cetera, of a military.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Let me just ask this final question before I turn it back to the chairman.

With scarce resources, I think it makes sense to try to have demilitarization and to attempt to have nations spend less in that area and more into social services and education, and those kinds of things. I understand that at a recent OAU meeting in Senegal this type of discussion came about.

With—and any of you could answer this. We have two, I think in my opinion, examples of African nations that have moved into democracy in a good way. If you look at Zambia with the recent election, where Mr. Kaunda accepted the results and in one day turned over the transition of the government.

But both of these countries are struggling, and democracy is difficult. It is a great concept, but it necessarily does not help the employment rate immediately, or cost of living or inflation. And to me, it seems that since we are talking democratization, these are two outstanding examples of people doing the right thing and doing what we say is the right thing.

It would appear to me, then, that there should be perhaps a special category. But in the case of both of these countries, there have been no increase. As a matter of fact, we had to battle on when it was recommended that they receive a half a million dollars in aid. I do not even know how you get a half a million dollars in aid anywhere. You know, it would get lost on the way. But that was what was suggested.

What is your feelings of any of the three of you on that subject? I mean, it is just—Mr. Crocker?

Mr. CROCKER. I am with you. I think there should be a way to support winners, in various ways. I know that Secretary Cohen, and I am sure that his successor will feel that way, as well. The question is how to make the bureaucracy function so that that is the net result.

But I think what you are describing is a special title of some sort, a special kind of identified pool of funds. I was as upset as you were at the initial mark for Namibia. I do not think it was really a long-term plan. But people looked at the GNP per capita and said, "Well, there are poorer countries." That is true. But there are fewer, there are few countries that have had a more democratic start in life than Namibia. So there ought to be some recognition for that.

Ms. DERRYCK. I think that what you are probably talking about is what we are doing, is putting a conditionality on some of our assistance. And we have been doing that for some time in terms of movement toward more democratic, open, plural systems.

And the success story in this is Benin, which had its aid level raised by fourfold after it had a successful election.

I suppose the problem becomes what happens when there are some slight steps backward within the process. So that you have a situation now in Zambia in which one has to be concerned because of the imposition of a state of emergency. So there are—we really do need to be able to support democratic change, and to be able to have some opportunities to have discussions to see ways in which we can be helpful to ensure that the process continues without the kinds of lurches and slips that we sometimes see.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK. Just two more questions. Mr. Crocker, what is your opinion of the efficiency and the efficacy of the CSSDCA? And for the noncognizant, that is the Conference on Security, Stability and Development and Cooperation in Africa. It has taken me 10 minutes to memorize that.

Mr. CROCKER. Well, it is an indication that good ideas develop a life of their own. There is also a similar—there was a parallel proposal for the Mediterranean countries at one point.

Really, I see it as a way to strengthen linkages between Africa and the rest of the world in a number of fields; to strengthen them institutionally, at the regional organization level, at the government-to-government level. And I think that is healthy. We need more of that. That is a way to avoid marginalization.

I also think that concept has taken on a life of its own in other channels, now. I think some of the things going on within the OAU can trace some of their origins back to the ideas put forward in meetings of the African Leadership Forum.

There is a dialogue going on here. It is a constructive dialogue.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Last question for Professor Zartman. You addressed Zaire a little obliquely in your five points here dealing with the United Nations, and going in with emergency blue hats doing governmental infrastructure. I am just paraphrasing that.

But the blue hats did not prevail in Somalia. Where did they fail, where do you think they will succeed in your plan?

Mr. ZARTMAN. Well, I am not sure the blue hats' experience has been completely worked out. I am talking about a corps that would help, as we need to do in Somalia now, that would help to buildup the institutions of civil society and—

Mr. JOHNSTON. With a totally different mission than—

Mr. ZARTMAN. That is right. That is right, yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. That is all I have. I sincerely appreciate your indulging the bells and things. You have been very, very informative. And to you, particularly, Professor Zartman, to spend the day with us, you have been very helpful.

Thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

TESTIMONY OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

HERMAN J. COHEN

ON PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

BEFORE

THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFRICA SUBCOMMITTEE

MARCH 31, 1993

(41)

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, ONCE AGAIN I HAVE THE PLEASURE TO TESTIFY BEFORE YOU. I REGRET THAT GEORGE MOOSE COULD NOT BE HERE, BUT THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HAS HELD CONFIRMATION HEARINGS ON HIS NOMINATION AND I HOPE THAT HE WILL BE CONFIRMED BEFORE THE END OF THE WEEK.

WE NOW KNOW THAT THE END OF THE COLD WAR HAS ALLOWED CONFLICTS LONG SUPPRESSED BY BIPOLAR TENSION TO RE-EMERGE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. IN AFRICA, WHERE ETHNIC TENSIONS EXIST IN COMBINATION WITH RAPIDLY-GROWING POPULATIONS, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL CLEAVAGES; AND WHERE THIRTY YEARS OF AUTHORITARIANISM HAVE LEFT A LEGACY OF INTOLERANCE; CONFLICT RESOLUTION IS THIS DECADE'S MOST URGENT CHALLENGE.

I AM PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO WORK WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THIS ISSUE, AND IT IS GRATIFYING TO ME THAT YOU HAVE SCHEDULED A FULL DAY OF YOUR VERY LIMITED TIME TO HEAR ABOUT THIS COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT ISSUE FROM A WIDE VARIETY OF VIEWPOINTS.

RESOLUTION OF AFRICA'S MANY CONFLICTS IS NECESSARY FOR STABILITY, ECONOMIC REFORM, DEMOCRATIZATION AND BETTER GOVERNANCE. THE TRAGIC HUMAN SUFFERING CAUSED BY THESE CONFLICTS IS MORE THAN A BRAKE ON THE DEVELOPMENT AFRICA SO DESPERATELY NEEDS; IT IS AN IMPERATIVE FOR INTERVENTION

AND MASSIVE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RELIEF WHICH COULD BE CHanneLED INTO MORE PRODUCTIVE HELP FOR AFRICA IN THE ABSENCE OF CONFLICT. IT IS WISER (AND LESS EXPENSIVE) TO PAY FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION THAN TO SHOULDER THE IMMENSE BURDENS OF REFUGEE ASSISTANCE, FAMINE RELIEF, EMERGENCY INTERVENTION, AND REBUILDING DESTROYED INFRASTRUCTURE. THE NEED FOR A TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION IS GREAT, AND RESOURCES ARE LIMITED.

THE ADMINISTRATION IS NOW CONDUCTING A FULL-SCALE REVIEW OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES WORLDWIDE. WHILE THE RESULTS OF THAT STUDY ARE STILL SOME TIME OFF, WE HAVE DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THESE PROBLEMS IN AFRICA; AND TODAY I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE OUR THINKING WITH YOU.

I SPEAK AS A PRACTITIONER RATHER THAN AS A THEORIST. THE RULES OF THE GAME IN AFRICA CAN BE VERY HARD ON LOSERS. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, COMMON GOALS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT CONFLICT RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES CAN BE USED ONLY AFTER WE HAVE CONVINCED ALL THE PARTIES THAT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WILL NOT JEOPARDIZE THEM, THEIR FAMILIES, OR THEIR PRINCIPLES. MISTRUST IS OFTEN DEEP, AND PATIENCE IS REQUIRED TO MAKE GOOD USE OF OUR RESOURCES AND OUR EFFORTS.

WE PURSUE CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA AS A CRUCIAL FIRST STEP TOWARD IMPROVING THOSE FACTORS WHICH LEAD TO STABILITY, THE RULE OF LAW, AND GOOD GOVERNMENT. THIS APPROACH INCLUDES SOME STRONGLY-HELD AMERICAN VALUES WHICH ARE WORLDWIDE IN PRACTICE.

WE APPROACH CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEMAKING GENERALLY IN FOUR WAYS:

- FIRST, THROUGH **PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY**. THIS IS A CORE PART OF OUR POLICY AND PROGRAMS IN AFRICA. WE STRIVE WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO AVERT THE COSTS OF HUMAN SUFFERING CONFLICT INVARIABLY CAUSES.
- SECOND, THROUGH **MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY**. WE WORK CLOSELY WITH THE UN AND AFRICAN REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS (INCLUDING THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY [OAU] AND THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES [ECOWAS]) WHICH HAVE THE CREDIBILITY TO SUPPORT SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA.
- THIRD, THROUGH **PARTICIPATION IN A MEDIATION EFFORT**, AS IN ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND RWANDA. THERE ARE OFTEN ADVANTAGES TO WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO BROKER AND/OR IMPLEMENT AGREEMENTS TO END CONFLICTS. BUT OUR ROLE AS THE WORLD'S REMAINING SUPERPOWER OFTEN MAKES THE U.S. IMPRIMATUR AN ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO A LASTING SETTLEMENT.

- AND FINALLY, THROUGH **INFORMAL COOPERATION** WITH SUCH ORGANIZATIONS AS THE GLOBAL COALITION FOR AFRICA (GCA), THE AFRICA LEADERSHIP FORUM, THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE (AAI), THE CARTER CENTER, AFRICARE, AND THE MANY OTHER NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE STRIVING TO DEVELOP CREATIVE NEW APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA AT ALL LEVELS.

OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE IS THE REINFORCEMENT OF AFRICANS' OWN ABILITY TO RESOLVE THEIR INTERNAL AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS. CONSEQUENTLY, MUCH OF OUR ASSISTANCE CONCENTRATES ON BUILDING THE CONFLICT-RESOLUTION CAPACITY OF EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE OAU AND ECOWAS. THE OAU IS NOW DEVELOPING A PERMANENT PEACEKEEPING STRUCTURE, AND THE U.S. HAS ALREADY PROVIDED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORT OF THAT EFFORT.

IN MANY COUNTRIES -- RWANDA, MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA, AND SOMALIA, FOR EXAMPLE -- DIRECT ASSISTANCE (INCLUDING IN SOME CASES OUR SCARCE FMF AND ESF RESOURCES) HAS BEEN APPROPRIATE. SOME FORMS OF HELP CRITICAL FOR PEACE MUST COME FROM OUTSIDE AFRICA, SUCH AS DEMINING OPERATIONS AND THE REMOVAL OF OTHER ORDNANCE.

WITH THE WORLD BANK AND OTHER DONORS, WE ARE NOW BEGINNING TO ASSIST WITH THE REDUCTION OF OVERSIZED MILITARY FORCES AND THE REDEFINITION OF THE REMAINING

FORCES' ROLES IN UGANDA. WE ARE STUDYING CREATIVE WAYS TO ASSIST DEMOBILIZATION AND DOWNSIZING OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE CONTINENT -- AN ACTIVITY WITH BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PAYOFFS. THE U.S. ALREADY HELPS WITH MILITARY "NATION-BUILDING" PROJECTS IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, BUT MORE RESOURCES (INCLUDING PROVISIONS FOR ADJUSTMENT TO CIVILIAN LIFE AND RETRAINING) ARE NEEDED TO MAKE DEMOBILIZATION EFFECTIVE.

ALLOW ME TO REVIEW BRIEFLY THE AREAS WHERE WE ARE OR HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVELY ENGAGED IN PEACEMAKING:

- THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO **NAMIBIAN** INDEPENDENCE, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN 1977-88, WERE A TRIUMPH OF U.S. DIPLOMACY. IN THE FINAL STAGES OF THE PROCESS (1987-88) THE U.S. WAS THE OFFICIAL MEDIATOR, WITH THE THEN-SOVIET UNION PLAYING A HELPFUL UNOFFICIAL ROLE DUE TO ITS CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS TO CUBA AND THE DOS SANTOS GOVERNMENT. THE NEW YORK AGREEMENTS OF DECEMBER 1988 LED TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA, BOTH UNDER UN SUPERVISION. THE REVELATION ON MARCH 24 THAT SOUTH AFRICA POSSESSED NUCLEAR DEVICES ADDS NEW LUSTER TO OUR MEDIATION ROLE, WHICH MAY HAVE PREVENTED A NUCLEAR TRAGEDY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

- IN **ANGOLA** THE U.S., THE PORTUGUESE, AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION WORKED CLOSELY TO ACHIEVE THE 1991 CEASE-FIRE WHICH ENDED FIFTEEN YEARS OF CIVIL WAR AND MADE ELECTIONS POSSIBLE. THE SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS WERE SUPERVISED BY UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL MONITORS; BUT UNITA REJECTED THE RESULTS AND BOTH SIDES HAVE RESUMED HOSTILITIES. OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY IN ANGOLA IS AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND A RETURN TO SERIOUS, DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND UNITA UNDER UN AUSPICES BASED ON THE 1991 BICESSE ACCORDS.

- IN **LIBERIA**, THE PARTIES LOOKED TO THE UNITED STATES FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE EARLY STAGES OF CONFLICT BECAUSE OF OUR HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP. A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) TOOK OVER THE MEDIATION EFFORT EARLY IN 1990, BUT LACK OF PROGRESS LED TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF A SIX-NATION PEACEMAKING TASK-FORCE, CALLED THE ECOWAS MONITORING GROUP (ECOMOG) IN AUGUST 1990. THAT OPERATION WAS SUCCESSFUL IN SAVING THE CITY OF MONROVIA FROM TOTAL DESTRUCTION AND PREVENTING WIDESPREAD FIGHTING UNTIL OCTOBER 1992, BUT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO FORCE CHARLES TAYLOR'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE YAMOUSSOUKRO ACCORDS, WHICH WERE BROKERED BY

ECOWAS AND SIGNED BY TAYLOR. THE U.S. HAS CONTINUED TO PLAY A FACILITATIVE ROLE TOWARD PROMOTING THE ACCORDS, AND FOR SOME MONTHS IN 1990-91 MAINTAINED A CONSIDERABLE NAVAL FORCE OFF THE LIBERIAN COAST. ECOMOG HAS RECEIVED THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, AND UN SPECIAL ENVOY GORDON-SOMERS IS FORMULATING RECOMMENDATIONS OF HOW THE UN MIGHT MORE DIRECTLY BOLSTER THE PEACEKEEPING EFFORT THERE. THE U.S. SUPPORTED ECOWAS BY PROVIDING NEARLY \$29 MILLION IN PEACEKEEPING SUPPORT (IN ADDITION TO OVER \$203 MILLION IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, WHICH SHOWS THE SCALE OF THOSE NEEDS IN SUCH A SITUATION).

- OUR INVOLVEMENT IN ETHIOPIA WAS STIMULATED IN PART BY THE U.S. DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH THEN-SOVIET PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IN RESOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS. THE SOVIETS BROUGHT US IN -- AFTER YEARS OF FRIGID RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE MENGISTU REGIME -- TO RELIEVE THEM OF A MAJOR FINANCIAL BURDEN. FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER WAS ORIGINALLY THE MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE REGIME AND THE ERITREAN INSURGENCY; THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS BROUGHT IN LATER. MEDIATION DID NOT END THE WAR, HOWEVER. THE INSURGENTS DEFEATED THE REGIME IN MAY 1991. AS MEDIATORS WE INFLUENCED THE END OF THE WAR AND ASSISTED IN THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND ERITREAN SELF-DETERMINATION AFTER THE WAR.

- IN **MOZAMBIQUE**, U.S. INVOLVEMENT BEGAN SEVERAL YEARS AGO WITH AN EFFORT TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT CHISSANO TO ACCEPT THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH RENAMO WERE ESSENTIAL. WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT -- AT TIMES, PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT -- PROVED INSTRUMENTAL IN BRINGING THE MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT TO THE TABLE. U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN INDIRECT. THE ITALIAN RELIGIOUS ORDER, ST. EGIDIO, HAS BEEN THE MEDIATOR, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF BEIRA. HOWEVER, AS AN OFFICIAL OBSERVER, WE WERE ABLE TO MOVE THE SIDES ALONG WHEN IMPASSES THREATENED DURING THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO THE MAY 1992 ACCORD; AND U.S. TECHNICAL EXPERTS IN LAW AND MILITARY AFFAIRS PROVIDED CRITICAL SUPPORT IN DEVISING TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS.

- IN **RWANDA**, WE HAVE HAD FACILITATORS IN THE FIELD THROUGHOUT THE LAST TEN MONTHS TRYING TO KEEP THE PARTIES TALKING. THE U.S. PLANS TO CONTINUE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE OAU PEACEKEEPING FORCE NOW DEPLOYED IN NORTHERN RWANDA. WE HAVE PROVIDED ABOUT \$ 1 MILLION TO DATE IN FMF AND ESF TO THIS FIRST IMPORTANT OAU EFFORT TO END A TRAGIC CIVIL WAR. RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS IN ARUSHA, TANZANIA, NOW GIVE CAUSE FOR HOPE.

- IN SOMALIA, WE ARE WORKING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS TO REBUILD A BADLY FRAGMENTED SOCIETY. ELEVEN AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TROOPS OR OTHER ASSISTANCE TO THIS EFFORT SO FAR. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSFERRING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS MAJOR PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

- SOUTH AFRICA PRESENTS A UNIQUE PROBLEM. THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES DEEPLY THAT ACHIEVING A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA REQUIRES AN END TO FURTHER POLITICAL AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE. CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA IS A FACTOR CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF A TRANSITION TO A REPRESENTATIVE AND NON-RACIAL GOVERNMENT AND TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THAT COUNTRY, THE REGION, AND THE CONTINENT. WE ARE COMMITTED TO ASSISTING THAT PROCESS WHEN AND WHERE POSSIBLE. AS IS THE CASE ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA, THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES MUST DETERMINE (AND LIVE WITH) THE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS; BUT WHERE WE CAN HELP WITH ASSISTANCE AND SIMPLE "HONEST BROKERING", WE INTEND TO DO SO. ALTHOUGH INFORMAL AND LOW-KEY, OUR INPUTS OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE ENGAGED IN HELPING AFRICANS RESOLVE THESE CONFLICTS: AND THERE ARE OTHERS WHICH COULD REQUIRE ASSISTANCE IN THE FUTURE. ETHNIC VIOLENCE CONTINUES BETWEEN TUAREGS AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF MOST OF THE SAHELIAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY NIGER AND MALI;

SUDAN IS RIVEN WITH A NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT; THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT HAS FURTHER DESTABILIZED NEIGHBORING SIERRA LEONE; THE IMPASSE HAS WORSENERD IN TOGO; CAMEROON IS TORN BY ETHNIC, LINGUISTIC, AND POLITICAL STRIFE; ZAIRE COULD DRIFT INTO CIVIL WAR IF MOBUTU CONTINUES TO OBSTRUCT DEMOCRATIC CHANGE. THESE CONTINGENCIES -- AS WELL AS THE ONGOING PEACEMAKING EFFORTS -- WILL NEED OUR CONTINUAL ATTENTION AND OUR ASSISTANCE.

UNAVOIDABLY, THERE HAVE BEEN MISTAKES AND FALSE STARTS. NOT ALL PARTIES WILL UNDERSTAND THAT CONFLICT RESOLUTION DOES NOT MEAN ALLOWING PEOPLE WITH GUNS TO PRESCRIBE ONE-SIDED "SOLUTIONS" TO LONGSTANDING POLITICAL, ETHNIC, AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. WE HAVE OCCASIONALLY UNDERESTIMATED THE DEPTH OF FEELING, THE DISTRUST, THE FEAR, AND FRANKLY THE HOSTILITY WHICH OPPOSING SIDES OFTEN BRING TO THE TABLE. MORE IMPORTANTLY, SOME OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS SIMPLY ACTED IN BAD FAITH WITH NO INTEREST IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

WE HAVE ENOUGH EXPERIENCE IN AFRICAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO HAVE LEARNED SOME IMPORTANT LESSONS -- A NUMBER OF THEM THE HARD WAY:

- U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IS CONSIDERED DESIRABLE BY MOST AFRICANS, AND THE U.S. IS SEEN AS IMPARTIAL. U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IS HIGHLY PRIZED. OUR INVOLVEMENT REASSURES THE PARTIES, AND

THE PRESENCE OF THE ONLY REMAINING SUPERPOWER SEEMS TO SERVE AS A MORAL GUARANTEE THAT AGREEMENTS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED.

- WE HAVE LEARNED THAT AGREEMENTS MUST BE SIMPLE AND WORKABLE. WE SHOULD NOT APPLAUD SOLELY BECAUSE THE PARTIES HAVE SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED AN AGREEMENT, HOWEVER IMPRACTICAL.
- FROM OUR EXPERIENCE IN ANGOLA, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT JOINT COMMISSIONS FORMED SOLELY BY REPRESENTATIVES OF PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT DO NOT WORK WELL. THERE NEEDS TO BE A REFEREE. IN ANGOLA, THE LACK OF A REFEREE LED TO PARALYSIS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE. THE UN WILL PLAY THAT ROLE IN MOZAMBIQUE.
- WE CANNOT RUSH ELECTIONS. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE COMPLETELY IMPLEMENTED. IN ANGOLA, THE FAILURE TO COMPLETE DEMOBILIZATION ALLOWED UNITA TO RETAIN A HIDDEN ARMY. FURTHERMORE, "WINNER-TAKE-ALL" ELECTIONS DO NOT LEAD TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. WE WERE PLEASED TO HEAR NELSON MANDELA PLEDGE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY IF THE ANC WINS THE FIRST NONRACIAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA.
- AMNESTY AND FORGIVENESS MUST BE PART OF THE EQUATION. WHEN OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS (OR FOR THAT MATTER,

AGGRIEVED GOVERNMENTS) ANNOUNCE THAT THERE WILL BE A NUREMBURG-LIKE TRIAL AFTER THE WAR, THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT.

- FORCE MUST SOMETIMES BE PART OF THE EQUATION. ECOWAS MEDIATION IN LIBERIA WAS INEFFECTIVE WITHOUT ECOMOG; U.S.-LED INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA PROVIDED A CHANCE FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. MONITORING WITHOUT THE ABILITY TO ENFORCE CAN UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS.

WE ALSO HAVE A FEW IDEAS TO IMPROVE THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESS IN AFRICA AND MAKE OUR OWN ROLE MORE EFFECTIVE:

- ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT WISH TO PRESCRIBE SOLUTIONS, CONTINUING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IS CRITICAL TO SUCCESS IN MANY PARTS OF THE CONTINENT. WE NEED A REGULAR MECHANISM FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT, SINCE THE U.S. IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED IMPARTIAL AND U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY IN JURIDICIAL AND MILITARY MATTERS, IS HIGHLY VALUED, AS OUR EXPERIENCES IN MOZAMBIQUE AND RWANDA HAVE DEMONSTRATED.
- CONFLICTS GENERATE LARGE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS. FORMER SOLDIERS NEED RETRAINING TO READAPT THEM TO CIVILIAN LIFE. ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO PROFESSIONALIZE AND INTEGRATE DOWNSIZING

MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS.

- THE USE OF FORCE TO ESTABLISH PEACE -- "PEACE ENFORCEMENT" AS OPPOSED TO "PEACEKEEPING" -- IS EXPENSIVE AND OCCASIONALLY RISKY. NONETHELESS, THE EXAMPLES OF SOMALIA AND LIBERIA SET PRECEDENTS FOR THE USE OF FORCE TO END ACTUAL FIGHTING AND MAKE CONDITIONS MORE FERTILE FOR NEGOTIATION. MASSIVE UNILATERAL INTERVENTION BY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RARELY BE NECESSARY; AFRICAN SOLUTIONS -- SUCH AS THAT BY ECOWAS IN LIBERIA -- ARE MORE EFFECTIVE. AFRICANS ARE WILLING TO PAY A PRICE FOR THIS INVOLVEMENT (AS NIGERIA HAS IN PAYING THE LION'S SHARE OF ECOMOG EXPENSES), BUT THEY WILL LOOK TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HELP THEM MEET PART OF THE MASSIVE COSTS OF SUCH PEACE ENFORCEMENT.

- THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGULARIZED AFRICAN MECHANISMS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION IS INDISPENSABLE FOR LONG-TERM STABILITY. THE OAU HAS TAKEN SEVERAL EARLY STEPS AWAY FROM ITS TRADITIONALLY STRICT DOCTRINE OF NONINTERVENTION. AFRICA NEEDS A SYSTEM OF MEDIATION AND RECONCILIATION WHICH GOVERNMENTS OR OTHER PARTIES CAN CALL ON WHEN A FULL BLOWN CONFLICT ERUPTS REQUIRING INTERVENTION. THERE ARE MODELS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS IN BOTH LATIN AMERICA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO HELPING THE OAU ESTABLISH SUCH MECHANISMS, AS WE DEMONSTRATED BY PROVIDING \$1 MILLION

TOWARD THE OAU'S INITIAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
PEACEKEEPING EFFORT IN RWANDA.

FINALLY, LET ME SPEAK ABOUT THE ROLE OF OUR DONOR
PARTNERS IN THIS PROCESS. DONOR GOVERNMENTS, THE EC,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND UNITED NATIONS
AGENCIES ARE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTORS TO AFRICAN
DEVELOPMENT, AND WE SHARE WITH THEM AN UNDERSTANDING OF
AND AN INTEREST IN AFRICA'S NEED FOR INTERNAL STABILITY.
WE ARE COORDINATING CLOSELY WITH INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS
AND INSTITUTIONS IN EVERY CASE; AND SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS
AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS HAVE CONTRIBUTED FINANCIALLY AND
OTHERWISE TO THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION EFFORT IN INDIVIDUAL
COUNTRIES.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA, AS ELSEWHERE, IS NOT
THE LABOR OF A DAY OR A WEEK. NOR IS IT AN ISSUE AT WHICH
WE CAN SIMPLY THROW MONEY, ALTHOUGH THE NEED FOR RESOURCES
IS GREAT. AS AFRICA ATTEMPTS TO MEET THE DIFFICULT
CHALLENGE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, THE BUREAU OF AFRICAN
AFFAIRS INTENDS TO REMAIN INVOLVED TO HELP ENSURE THE
SUCCESS OF PRACTICAL MECHANISMS AND LONG-TERM EFFORTS TO
BUILD TRUST, TOLERANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY.

STATEMENT OF
JAMES L. WOODS
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MARCH 31, 1993

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS DOD'S INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES REGARDING PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA. I WOULD START BY OBSERVING THAT DOD POLICY AND ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA ARE FOCUSED ON SUPPORTING OUR OVERALL NATIONAL INTERESTS. SECRETARY COHEN HAS OUTLINED VERY WELL OUR COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION ON THAT CONTINENT, AND THE HIGH PRIORITY WE ASSIGN TO THAT ACTIVITY.

MR CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE THE COMMITTEE AND OTHERS PRESENT TO UNDERSTAND THAT I DO NOT APPEAR AS AN EXPERT ON PEACEKEEPING, BUT AS A PERSON WITH POLICY OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES -- SINCE 1986 -- FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. I HAVE FOLLOWED THE ISSUES OF PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLOSELY, HAVE BEEN PERSONALLY VERY INVOLVED FROM TIME TO TIME AS A MEMBER OF NEGOTIATING TEAMS FORMED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ENCOURAGE GREATER SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING ON AN INTERAGENCY BASIS. I AM HAPPY

TO SHARE MY VIEWS WITH YOU TODAY, BUT THESE ARE NOT AUTHORITATIVE RULES OR VIEWS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON PEACEKEEPING IN GENERAL.

MR CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT BUSH, LAST YEAR, AND PRESIDENT CLINTON, THIS YEAR, HAVE AFFIRMED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY TO PREVENT, CONTAIN, AND RESOLVE CONFLICT ACROSS THE GLOBE. WITH THE END OF THE COLD WAR, PEACEKEEPING ACTIONS WHICH EARLIER WOULD HAVE BEEN VETOED IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ARE PROLIFERATING. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE ALSO BEGINNING TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE. GONE IS THE UNWRITTEN RULE THAT NEITHER OF THE SUPERPOWERS COULD PROVIDE LARGE NUMBERS OF PEACEKEEPERS TO UN OPERATIONS. THE UNITED STATES HAS DONE SO (IN KUWAIT), IS DOING SO (MOST NOTABLY IN SOMALIA), AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. RUSSIA HAS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN DOING SO, FINANCES PERMITTING.

AS MY OFFICE HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION ISSUES, I HAVE NOTICED THAT TOO OFTEN "TERMS OF ART" HAVE VARIOUS MEANINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE. SO BEFORE I TALK ABOUT DOD'S COMMITMENT TO PEACEKEEPING IN GENERAL AND OUR SPECIFIC EFFORTS IN AFRICA, LET ME SET FORTH FOR YOU SOME TERMS THAT ARE IN USE, INCLUDING AT THE UN, TO DESCRIBE DIFFERENT STAGES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION.

- FIRST, THERE IS **PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY**. THIS IS THE SPHERE LARGELY OF MY STATE DEPARTMENT COLLEAGUES AND ONE IN WHICH AMBASSADOR COHEN AND HIS PREDECESSOR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER, HAVE BEEN NOTABLY ACTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL. HERE THE U.S. ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT DISPUTES FROM ARISING BETWEEN PARTIES, TO PREVENT EXISTING DISPUTES FROM ESCALATING INTO CONFLICTS, AND TO LIMIT THE SPREAD OF CONFLICTS WHEN THEY OCCUR.

- SECOND, AND VERY CLOSELY RELATED, IS **PEACEMAKING**. HERE WE TRY TO SECURE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES THAT COULD LEAD TO CONFLICT. THE TOOLS USED ARE STILL DIPLOMATIC, INCLUDING MEDIATION AND NEGOTIATION.

- THIRD IS **PEACEKEEPING**. THIS IS THE PREVENTION, CONTAINMENT, MODERATION OR TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES AMONG, BETWEEN, OR WITHIN STATES THROUGH THE INTERVENTION OF A NEUTRAL PARTY. THIS IS USUALLY ORGANIZED AND IMPLEMENTED THROUGH A REGIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (MOST OFTEN THE UNITED NATIONS). ITS OBJECT IS TO MAINTAIN OR RESTORE PEACE. IT INVOLVES THE USE OF MILITARY FORCES, AND OFTEN POLICE AND CIVILIANS. IT IS USUALLY CONDUCTED WITH THE CONSENT OF THE PRINCIPAL BELLIGERENTS. PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES UNDER THE UN'S AEGIS ARE CHAPTER SIX ACTIONS. THROUGH THE LATE 1980'S, THESE WERE THE PRINCIPAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS.

- FOURTH IS **PEACE ENFORCEMENT** -- A GROWTH INDUSTRY IN RECENT YEARS. THIS INVOLVES MILITARY OPERATIONS TO RESTORE PEACE OR ESTABLISH AGREED CONDITIONS IN AN AREA OF CONFLICT OR TENSION, EVEN THOUGH THE PARTIES MAY NOT CONSENT TO INTERVENTION AND MAY STILL BE ENGAGED IN FIGHTING. WHEN CONDUCTED BY THE UN, THESE ARE CHAPTER SEVEN ACTIONS.

- A FIFTH CATEGORY IN SOME MINDS IS **PEACE-BUILDING**. THIS ENTAILS POST-CONFLICT ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN AND SOLIDIFY THE PEACE IN AN EFFORT TO PRECLUDE THE RESUMPTION OF ARMED CONFLICT.

FOR NOW, THE LEAD ORGANIZATION FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA (AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD) IS THE UNITED NATIONS. BUT BEFORE I DISCUSS THE UN, LET ME BRIEFLY SKETCH U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SEVERAL NON-UN CONFLICT RESOLUTION EFFORTS IN AFRICA. WE HAVE WORKED WITH AND THROUGH 1) **THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)**; 2) **THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)**; AND 3) **BILATERALLY OR WITH AD HOC GROUPS OF ACTORS**.

IN AUGUST 1990, AN AD HOC **ECOWAS** MILITARY ARM, **ECOMOG**, DEPLOYED TO LIBERIA TO TRY TO PUT AN END TO THE FIGHTING THAT HAD RAGED THERE SINCE THE PREVIOUS DECEMBER. THE U.S. HAS STRONGLY ENCOURAGED ECOWAS IN THIS REGIONAL PEACE MAKING ENDEAVOR. THE U.S. PROVIDED ECOWAS \$10.15 MILLION IN FY91 ESF; \$3.45M IN FY91 FMF (GAMBIA \$250K, GHANA \$500K, GUINEA

\$500K, IVORY COAST \$1M, AND SIERRA LEONE \$1.2M]; AND \$15M TO SENEGAL IN FY92 [\$5M IN FMF AND \$10M IN DOD GOODS AND SERVICES]. FURTHER, AMBASSADOR COHEN AND I AND MEMBERS OF OUR STAFFS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN COUNTLESS MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON AND ABROAD TO ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN END TO THE CONFLICT IN LIBERIA.

THE OAU IS CURRENTLY WORKING TO DEVELOP ITS OWN CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS. ALTHOUGH THE OAU HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, IT HAS NOT DEVELOPED A STANDING CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO THE NEEDS FOR MEDIATION, CONCILIATION, AND ARBITRATION IN AFRICA. AT THE 1992 OAU SUMMIT, SECRETARY-GENERAL SALIM SALIM PROPOSED THAT THE OAU MOVE FULL-TIME INTO MANAGING CONFLICTS, KNOWING THAT NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE SOME OF THE RESOURCES.

THE U.S. HAS MOVED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THIS INITIATIVE. IN EARLY 1992, AMBASSADOR COHEN AND I AGREED TO SEEK A PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION MAKING THE OAU ELIGIBLE FOR U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SUPPORT. THE PRESIDENT APPROVED, AND ISSUED SUCH A DETERMINATION ON AUGUST 25, 1992. WE THEN MOVED PROMPTLY TO PROVIDE THE OAU WITH \$1 MILLION FOR USE IN PKO [\$500K IN FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF) AND ANOTHER \$500K IN ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS (ESF)]. RECENTLY, WE DESIGNATED OUR MILITARY ATTACHÉ IN ADDIS ABABA AS A LIAISON OFFICER TO THE OAU AND HE HAS BEGUN WORKING WITH HIS MILITARY COUNTERPARTS TO IDENTIFY WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT HELP IMPROVE

THE OAU'S PLANNING AND EXECUTION CAPABILITIES FOR
PEACEKEEPING.

THE FIRST USE OF SOME OF THE FUNDS PROVIDED TO THE OAU HAS BEEN IN **RWANDA**, IN SUPPORT OF THE OAU CEASEFIRE MONITORING FORCE. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN INVOLVED IN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO END THAT CIVIL WAR. U.S. OBSERVER DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING MILITARY EXPERTS, HAVE PROVIDED TECHNICAL ADVICE AND GUIDANCE TO THE OAU SPONSORED PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THAT REGARD, LTC TONY MARLEY (PREVIOUSLY OF MY STAFF AND CURRENTLY ON AMBASSADOR COHEN'S STAFF) HAS SINCE LATE FEBRUARY BEEN SHUTTTLING BETWEEN KIGALI, KAMPALA, AND ARUSHA PROVIDING IMPARTIAL TECHNICAL ADVICE TO BOTH PARTIES IN THE TRAGIC CIVIL WAR. WE HAVE ALSO WORKED BEHIND THE SCENES BILATERALLY WITH THE VARIOUS PLAYERS, PROVIDING ADVICE AND ENCOURAGING COMPROMISE. THE PERCEPTION, BY ALL SIDES, OF THE U.S. AS AN "HONEST BROKER" HAS FACILITATED COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE REBELS AND THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT.

THOSE EFFORTS BY LTC MARLEY AND OTHERS ARE EXAMPLES OF THE THIRD TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION -- **BILATERAL OR AD HOC MULTI-LATERAL EFFORTS**. SINCE THE MID-1980S, I, MEMBERS OF MY STAFF, AND OFFICERS FROM THE JOINT STAFF HAVE BEEN INVOLVED, AS MEMBERS OF STATE-LED TEAMS, IN MANY OF THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION NEGOTIATIONS THAT AMBASSADOR COHEN HAS DESCRIBED. SPECIFICALLY, THESE INCLUDED NAMIBIA, ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA, AND MOZAMBIQUE, WHERE WE WORKED BILATERALLY

OR IN CONCERT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING PORTUGAL, ITALY, SOUTH AFRICA, AND RUSSIA.

AS I NOTED EARLIER, IN THIS POST-COLD WAR ERA, THE U.S.G. IS **RELYING PRINCIPALLY ON THE UNITED NATIONS** TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PEACEKEEPING. DOD HAS BEEN ACTIVELY WORKING WITH THE UN IN THIS REGARD. YOU ARE ALL WELL AWARE OF OUR ACTIVITIES REGARDING SOMALIA, BUT LET ME DESCRIBE SOME LESS WELL KNOWN ACTIVITIES IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. IN **ANGOLA**, DOD PERSONNEL PLAYED AN IMPORTANT SUPPORTING ROLE IN THE PEACE ACCORDS NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING SERVING AS TECHNICAL ADVISORS ON THE U.S. DELEGATION. WE THEN PROVIDED MILITARY OFFICERS TO SERVE AS OBSERVERS TO THE JOINT COMMISSIONS OVERSEEING THE PEACE PROCESS. TO SUPPLEMENT INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY RELIEF AND TO PROVIDE FOR SOLDIERS ENCAMPED FOR DEMOBILIZATION, WE AIRLIFTED, FROM DOD EXCESS STOCKS, OVER 3 MILLION MEALS READY TO EAT (MRES), THOUSANDS OF TENTS, AND OVER 60 TONS OF NON-FOOD ITEMS (BLANKETS, PLASTIC SHEETING, ETC.); AND SHIPPED 140 SEA-VANS OF MRES (APPROXIMATELY 2.6 MILLION MEALS). WE ALSO PROVIDED 3 C-130S, COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER SUPPORT TO ASSIST IN DEMOBILIZATION AND TO HELP WITH ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS.

THE UN MANDATE IN **MOZAMBIQUE**, WHICH EXTENDS FROM THE OCTOBER 1992 SIGNING OF THE PEACE ACCORD THROUGH ELECTIONS, NOW SCHEDULED FOR LATE 1993, REFLECTS LESSONS LEARNED IN ANGOLA AND OTHER COUNTRIES. IN MOZAMBIQUE, THE UN PLANS A

CONTINGENT OF UP TO 8,000 MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, INCLUDING AN INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER FORCE OF 350. BEFORE THE ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD, IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE NEW NATIONAL ARMY BE FORMED, TRAINED, AND DEPLOYED AND EXCESS SOLDIERS FROM BOTH SIDES DEMOBILIZED.

WE ARE PROVIDING TWO U.S. MILITARY OFFICERS TO ASSIST OUR DEFENSE ATTACHÉ IN MAPUTO IN PARTICIPATING IN THE UN CHAIRED COMMISSIONS OVERSEEING THE PEACE AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION, IN RESPONSE TO A UN REQUEST THAT THE U.S. PROVIDE MILITARY ENGINEERS TO ASSIST IN ROAD REPAIR IN MOZAMBIQUE, A JOINT STATE/DOD ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT TEAM IS JUST COMPLETING A FACT FINDING MISSION IN MOZAMBIQUE. THEY HAVE BEEN GATHERING DATA ON THE SCOPE OF THE REPAIRS REQUIRED AND THE UN'S CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THE POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ENGINEERING ASSETS.

IN BOTH **ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE**, WE SEE A POTENTIAL FOR THE U.S. MILITARY TO PLAY A PEACE-BUILDING ROLE THROUGH INVOLVEMENT WITH THE NEW ARMED FORCES, WHICH WILL REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL TRAINING ASSISTANCE. IN DOING SO, WE WOULD BE JOINING SEVERAL OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WHO HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE THAT TRAINING INITIALLY. WHEN POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES ARE RIGHT, THE U.S. COULD ESTABLISH A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WITH ANGOLA AND EXPAND OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WITH MOZAMBIQUE. OUR FOCUS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE ON TRAINING, THROUGH THE IMET PROGRAM (TO INCLUDE

EXPANDED IMET AND IMET-FUNDED MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS). IF THE CONGRESS HAS AT THAT TIME ALSO MADE FMF FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR AFRICA, WE COULD CONSIDER THESE COUNTRIES' MILITARIES AS CANDIDATES FOR ASSISTANCE IN NATION-BUILDING ACTIVITIES THROUGH THE "AFRICA CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM." WE ALSO THINK THAT BOTH COUNTRIES WOULD BENEFIT FROM PARTICIPATION IN OUR COASTAL SECURITY AND BIODIVERSITY PROGRAMS -- AGAIN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT FMF FUNDING IS AVAILABLE AT THE TIME.

LAST MONTH, MR. SHASI THAROOR, THE UNITED NATIONS' SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE UNDER-SECRETARY GENERAL FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, NOTED AT THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT THAT "THE UN HAS HAD AS MANY PKOS IN THE PAST 43 MONTHS AS IT HAS IN THE PREVIOUS FORTY THREE YEARS." MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH STILL REFERRED TO AS PKOS, THE NATURE OF THE OPERATIONS HAS CHANGED AND MANY OF THEM INVOLVE ENFORCING PEACE, NOT MERELY KEEPING IT. CONSEQUENTLY, IF THE U.S. IS TO WORK AS EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE IN DEALING WITH THIS CHANGED AND STILL CHANGING MILIEU, BOTH WE AND THE UN MUST MAKE CHANGES IN THE WAY WE DO BUSINESS.

A NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES -- REPEAT, POSSIBILITIES -- EXIST FOR IMPROVING UN CAPABILITIES. SOME THINGS WHICH CONCERNED OFFICES AT THE PENTAGON ARE LOOKING AT INCLUDE:

- A REORGANIZED AND EXPANDED UN SECRETARIAT STAFF TO INCREASE INFORMATION FLOW AND ENHANCE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION CAPABILITIES

- ESTABLISHMENT OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS TO ALERT SENIOR UN POLICY MAKERS BEFORE A CRISIS ERUPTS, SO THAT PREVENTIVE MEASURES CAN BE TAKEN

- SPEEDING UP THE UN'S ABILITY TO DETERMINE THAT A DISASTER REQUIRING AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE EXISTS

- ENHANCING THE UN'S ABILITY TO RESPOND WITH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE UN'S COMMODITY PURCHASE AND CONTRACTING SYSTEM NEEDS REFORM TO IMPROVE TIMELINESS

- ADOPTION OF STANDARDIZED MILITARY PROCEDURES AND INTEROPERABLE EQUIPMENT AMONG UN DEPLOYED FORCES

- ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN TRAINING CENTER TO ENHANCE BOTH UNILATERAL AND COMBINED TRAINING OF STAFFS AND FORCES

- FORMATION OF AN INTEGRATED UN STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCIES WHICH COMBINE MILITARY, HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL RESOURCES

- CREATION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION RESOURCES -- RADIO STATIONS AND NEWSPAPERS -- FOR USE IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES TO GET THE UN'S MESSAGE TO THE PUBLIC, AND

- NOTIFICATION BY MEMBER STATES OF THE SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES THAT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE FULL RANGE OF PEACEKEEPING (AND HUMANITARIAN) OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS STOCKPILING OF THAT EQUIPMENT MOST LIKELY TO BE REQUIRED.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT CRITICISM IS EASY, AND WE ARE ACTIVELY LOOKING FOR WAYS TO HELP IMPLEMENT SOME OF THESE AND OTHER IMPROVEMENTS. WE ARE OR WILL BE HELPING THE UN BY TEMPORARILY AUGMENTING KEY

POSITIONS ON THE MILITARY STAFF WITH TDY U.S. MILITARY OFFICERS, BY SECONDING AMERICAN PERSONNEL (CIVILIAN AND MILITARY) TO KEY POSITIONS ON THE CIVILIAN STAFF OF UNOSOM II IN SOMALIA, AND BY ESTABLISHING AN INTELLIGENCE SHARING MECHANISM. HOWEVER, WE NEED TO DO MORE. PRECISELY WHAT WE PROPOSE TO DO IS BEING ACTIVELY CONSIDERED. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAS BEEN WORKING INTENSIVELY TO DEVELOP IDEAS FOLLOWING PRESIDENT BUSH'S SEPTEMBER 21 SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON PEACEKEEPING, AND THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IS NOW FORMULATING A DETAILED CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGY. ALL OF THE ELEMENTS ARE NOT YET IN PLACE BUT I CAN DESCRIBE THE BROAD OUTLINES OF TWO KEY INITIATIVES WHICH MOST DIRECTLY CONCERN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

FIRST, SECRETARY ASPIN IS PROPOSING A REORGANIZATION OF THE POLICY CLUSTER WHERE I WORK, TO INCLUDE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR DEMOCRATIC SECURITY. THIS OFFICE WOULD HAVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION AS ONE OF ITS PRIMARY FUNCTIONS. PRESENTLY THERE IS ONE INDIVIDUAL WHO WORKS CONFLICT RESOLUTION FULL-TIME. BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, WE HOPE TO HAVE UP TO TEN PEOPLE DEVOTED TO THIS IMPORTANT TASK.

SECOND, THE JUST-SUBMITTED FY94 DOD BUDGET REFLECTS THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION AS AN IMPORTANT MEANS TO PROMOTE U.S. INTERESTS. SPECIFICALLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME DEFENSE IS EXPLICITLY BUDGETING NOT ONLY

FOR ON-GOING CONFLICT RESOLUTION OPERATIONS BUT FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE CONTINGENCIES. THE BUDGET CONTAINS A REQUEST FOR \$300 MILLION FOR PEACEKEEPING; THIS WILL COVER OUR INCREMENTAL COSTS OF PARTICIPATION IN UNOSOM II IN SOMALIA, AND WILL MAKE SUBSTANTIAL FUNDS AVAILABALE TO MEET NEW PKO REQUIREMENTS WHICH MAY ARISE. I EMPHASIZE THAT THIS CANVAS IS ONLY PARTIALLY FILLED IN. PLEASE RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE TRYING TO FORMULATE AN OVERARCHING POLICY AND STRATEGY ON THE RUN WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY DEALING WITH OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA AND WORKING IN VARYING DEGREES ON SITUATIONS IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA, RWANDA, LIBERIA, SUDAN, AND TOGO -- TO MENTION ONLY THE VIEW FROM AFRICA!

LIKE STATE'S AFRICA BUREAU, DOD CONSIDERS ITSELF INVOLVED IN PEACEKEEPING FOR THE LONG HAUL. IT IS GETTING MUCH ATTENTION BUT WE ARE FAR FROM HAVING WORKED OUT THE DETAILS OF OUR APPROACH. THIS PROCESS WILL BENEFIT FROM CONTINUING EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, AND I AM SURE THE ADVICE AND IDEAS WE GET FROM THIS TYPE OF HEARING WILL BE BENEFICIAL IN DEVELOPING NEW NATIONAL POLICY APPROACHES IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA. I THANK YOU FOR THE CHANCE TO MAKE THIS PRESENTATION AND LOOK FORWARD TO ANSWERING YOUR FURTHER QUESTIONS.

**Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Africa Subcommittee
(31 March 1993)**

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The newness of African political systems and the early stage of their political development account for the frequency of conflict within and among African states. External states have taken advantage of this conflict and have responded to African states' appeals for support and assistance, but have not been its cause. They have also joined African efforts to manage conflict, although actual resolution only comes with time and with full participation from the conflicting parties.

Conflict in Africa, as elsewhere, is the constituent of history; it indicates the importance of issues and it consecrates solutions. Conflict is so prevalent at African development because it is the means by which systems of internal and external relations are established in the formative stages of new states' history. Conflict concerns real and important stakes. In internal affairs, it establishes and corrects national systems of wielding power; in international relations, conflict is often needed to Africanize a foreign colonial inheritance, particularly in boundaries. Once these are developed and accepted, conflict can be expected to decrease, but that will only come a decade or more hence. As political attentions turn inward and the restraints of earlier systems of world order--colonial and then cold war--are lifted, conflict can be expected to increase until Africa feels obliged to establish its own systems of domestic and continental order.

The essential efforts toward the management of this conflict can only come from the parties involved, but some specific actions by a helpful outside power such as the United States can make a difference

- * 1) Reserve units of "Blue Hats," civilian equivalents of the UN Peacekeeping Forces' Blue Helmets, can be created to jump into action when help is needed to restore state structures and organize civil society
- * 2) Regional organizations, a crucial component of African conflict management, would strongly benefit from external support for their staff functions, currently hampered by members' arrears
- * 3) The US, patron saint of democratization, has done a poor job of explaining the meaning and components of democracy and needs to develop an inspirational and operational message that others can follow
- * 4) A network of African officials and private specialists, working with American experts, needs to be developed to "think conflict management," foster official reflexes, and study mechanisms of conflict reduction and prevention

* 5) Since undemarcated boundaries still remain a basic cause of conflict between new African states, a training program for boundary surveyors would constitute an effective good and aid for conflict management in this area.

Types and Causes of Conflict

Few of the 51 new states are historic entities and all have had to create and defend new institutions, rules, and practices, often through conflict. In addition to the independence struggles themselves, there have been four underlying sources of conflict--internal consolidations, internal collapse, boundary disputes, and structural rivalries.

Political consolidations over who is to enjoy the newly-won political power and establish the rules for its exercise often pit former factions of the liberation struggle against each other, and involve neighboring states offering sanctuary and support. Thus, the rival factions of the Angolan nationalist movement, the government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) (with support from the Organization of African Unity [OAU], the six Front Line States of southern Africa, and the USSR) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (with support from Zaire, South Africa, Morocco and the USA), have continued their conflict from independence in 1974 until its temporary shift from violence to politics through the Estorn agreement in 1991. After a branch of the National Liberation Front of Chad (FroLiNaT) under Hissene Habre won power in 1982, it continued to face military attacks from its predecessor, the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) of Goukouni Weddei (in which Habre had participated), and from neighboring Libya, but was evicted from power at the end of 1990 by a former lieutenant, Idriss Deby. In 1977 and 1978, the Zairean government, with support from Morocco, France, Belgium and the USA, beat off invasions into the southern province of Shaba (formerly Katanga) by dissident groups belonging to the Congolese National Liberation Front (FLNC) supported by Angola, and similar groups are returning to activity on both the national or the provincial levels as the contest for power opens in the early 1990s.

Rwandan refugees living for a decade and more in Uganda returned in 1990 to contest the Rwandan government. Since 1990, the military dictatorship of Samuel Doe in Liberia was under attack from the National Patriotic Front of Charles Taylor (supported by Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso) and other groups; when the Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) led by Nigeria intervened to preserve order, the country became divided between two competing governments led by Taylor and by Dr Amos Sawyer. The southern Sudanese rebellion which broke out again in 1982 after the collapse of

the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 is conducted by the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A) fighting not for secession but for a revolution in the entire Sudanese political system, with support and sanctuary from Ethiopia.

These conflicts are not simply feuds between rival leaders or factions or even tribes over power, but more importantly are struggles over the structures and practices of government in the future and its beneficiaries. In the near future, the pressure to change non-democratic regimes and to practice democracy is likely to provide the greatest single cause of conflict among African states, as anti-authoritarian movements and democratic parties find support in neighboring countries.

Political collapse results when the internal struggles are so balanced as to produce only losers rather than a clear victor capable of governing the state. The result is a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup or riot. It refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order has fallen apart and must be reconstituted. Order and power (but not legitimacy) devolves to local groups and is up for grabs; the state itself as a legitimate, functioning order is gone.

In the Congo in 1960-61, state collapse was marked by the refusal of state institutions (army, executives, local authorities and populations) to recognize each other's authority. Other African cases taking place about two decades later had somewhat different causes but similar characteristics. In Chad in 1980-82, state collapse resulted from a factional civil war among the guerrilla victors over the previous regime led by Goukouni Wedder and Hissene Habre, and the disappearance of all of the branches of central government--executive, legislative, judiciary, and bureaucracy. In Uganda in 1979-81, it came about after Idi Amin Dada had concentrated all power in his own delegitimizing hands and then fallen to a coalition of oppositions, leaving a power vacuum. In Ghana under the Third Republic of Hilla Liman between the two interventions of Flt. Lt Jerry Rawlings (1979-81), where collapse was less total than in the previous cases, the center nonetheless lost its control over the countryside and its ability to perform government functions even in the capital as opposition became more organized than the state and coercion and corruption replaced government. In all of these cases, an established but poorly functioning regime had been replaced by a military regime that concentrated power but was unable to exercise it effectively or legitimately, making the state contract and implode.

Another decade later, Africa is in the midst of yet another round of state collapse. In Somalia after 1990, Siad Barre had so concentrated power in the

hands of his clan that the whole country rose against him, using their own clans as their organizing base and delegitimizing both the idea and the practice of central state government. In Liberia after 1990, Samuel Doe's concentration of power in his hands for the benefit of his ethnic group alienated the rest of the country in support of Charles Taylor's rebellion but other groups arose to grasp for power as it fell from Doe to Taylor. In Ethiopia, after 1990, the 30-year Eritrean rebellion, first against the Emperor and after 1974 against the Marxist military regime which overthrew him, finally overcame the military with the aid of other ethnic rebellions but was unable to combine ethnic self-determination with effective central government.

In Angola and Mozambique, on the other hand, the governments have been contested by a regional rebellion since independence in 1974. UNITA has removed half of Angola from central state control without providing any effective government for it, and the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government spent its first 15 years in power concentrating on a Marxist ideology so inadequate for its needs that it ruined the part of the country it controlled, the Estoril agreement of 1991 led the following year to elections that were rejected by UNITA and civil war continues. A truce was finally negotiated in 1992 for Mozambique in 1992 between the Marxist misgovernment of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FreLiMo) and the terrorist bandit Mozambican National Resistance Movement (ReNaMo) (created by Rhodesia and sponsored by South Africa) but society, economy and the state have been destroyed. In neither case did central government disappear entirely but its exercise and legitimacy were severely restricted throughout the countryside and its effectiveness debilitated even in its own territory.

The current wave is not over, other cases are looming with certainty on the horizon. In Sudan, a situation similar to Angola and Mozambique, but also in part to Ethiopia, as the southern rebellion has become broader, the government has become more restricted in its identity and response, moving from national assertion to Islamicist repression, alienating many regions of the country. As in southern Africa, the writ of the government does not run nationwide, and collapse at the center is possible. In Zaire, in a pattern similar to that of the cases of the 1980's, Mobutu Sese Seko, the answer of the 1960s, finds himself isolated, alienated and, moreover, broke. A government born of the democratic movement whines for power, impotent.

III-defined territory provides every African states with reasons to challenge their boundaries if they will. African states were born under the OAU doctrine of uti possidetis juris whereby boundaries inherited from colonial rule

were declared to be inviolable. But in some cases (Morocco and Somalia) colonial boundaries did not exist and the states expressly declared themselves to be an exception to the 1964 OAU doctrine. In many other cases, boundaries were undemarcated and questionable. In still other cases, new "African" criteria of geography, ethnic unity, and even past history could be evoked to challenge the colonial inheritance. In other cases, new situations--notably offshore oil deposits--required new boundaries. Finally, in a few cases, regions of sovereign states used the same criteria to claim their own separate, sovereign existence.

The non-existent southern Moroccan-Algeria boundary was finally established by treaty in 1972, ratified by Algeria in 1973 but by Morocco only in 1989, since 1975 the two neighbors have been in a proxy war over the Western Sahara, over which the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiet al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) claims sovereignty as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The Somali-Ethiopian border has never been found to both sides' satisfaction, but Somalia supported the attempt of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) to occupy the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in a war in 1977-78; a decade later, the tide was reversed, as Ethiopian-supported movements of Somali dissidents occupied much of northern Somalia and then declared it independent as Somaliland.

Delimited but still contested boundaries led to a bloody outburst between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989, and to a triple series of wars between Mali and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) in 1963, 1974 and 1985 over a small barren strip with some meager minerals but alot of national pride attached. Maritime extensions of boundaries across offshore oilfields caused conflict between Nigeri and Cameroun in 1981, between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal in 1988-90, between Libya and Tunisia until 1982.

New and "more authentic" justifications were invoked by Idi Amin's Uganda to claim the Kagera river rather than a geometric boundary with Tanzania in 1979, and by Dadhdhafi's Libya to claim an unratified 1934 colonial treaty and a private cession in 1973 as the basis of its occupation of the Aouzou strip of northern Chad. None of these new justifications have been sustained, but all of the claims have occasioned expensive military engagements with heavy losses.

Although no African state has lost any territory to a secessionist movement and only once have two states (Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1963) merged, total territorial disputes involving new claims at statehood are still causes of major conflicts. Like the Polisario, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) claims independence for Eritrea on the basis of a separate status under colonial rule, and the ensuing war which has raged since the replacement of the Ethiopian-Eritrean

federation by a centralized Ethiopian state in 1962 ended with the collapse of the Ethiopian regime and empire in 1991. On the other hand, the attempted coup d'état in Gambia in 1981 was met with Senegalese intervention and the creation of a Senegambian Confederation that gradually weakened until declared defunct (perhaps only temporarily) in 1989.

It should be noted, however, that African states on significant if not numerous occasions have handled their boundary problems by negotiation, even making peaceful rectifications. The Mali-Mauritania border agreement of 1963 redrew the boundary to take into account traditional waterholes. The administrative boundary between Sudan and Egypt and the submerged boundary under Lake Nasir have been agreed to peaceably (after a scare in 1958). Referenda in Cameroun and Togo around the time of independence effected territorial changes in the new states. Morocco and Algeria established a boundary where there was none in 1972.

Yet as long as contested boundaries are not delimited while the heat of a crisis is off, and as long as delimited boundaries are not demarcated, even established boundaries will return as sources of conflict. As long as border agreements are not established between neighbors, providing mechanisms for handling inevitable incidents in the passage of border populations and the conduct of trade and mining, such incidents will either be used by policy or lead policy to tension and conflict.

Structural rivalries arise because new states have not yet worked out expectations about rank and relations among neighbors interacting within a region. Although such rivalries are not the immediate source of conflict, they make smaller disputes more significant. The Saharan dispute is a battle between Algeria and Morocco, with Libya also involved, over leadership of the Maghrib. Libya's support for incursions into Tunisia and Niger in 1980 and 1982, into Sudan in 1978 and 1986, and into Chad in 1980 were part of its attempt to dominate Arab Africa, particularly against Egyptian influence. Intervention of West African neighbors in the Liberian civil war is an act in the drama over Nigerian leadership in West Africa. The Shaba invasions of 1977-78 and the Angolan civil war are events in the struggle for predominance in the region between Angola and Zaire, and South Africa's incursions into Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe and its support for UNITA in Angola and the Mozambican National Resistance (ReNaMo) under its policy of destabilization (1978-1988) were means of assuring its predominance in the region as much as means of destroying the foreign bases of the African National Congress (ANC). Such rivalries give a large structure to the many smaller conflicts on the continent, in the same way as European history was

shaped over the past half-millennium or as the structural rivalry between the USA and the USSR shaped world history for half a century or more.

External powers are involved in these conflicts because weak African states seek to borrow power from outside. During the Cold War, such conflicts often escalated to the highest level, as superpowers supported local efforts to block allies of their superpower rival. The most important support from outside Africa has come from the continuing security role that French-speaking African states expect of their former metropole. When conflicts oppose a non-French-speaking to a French-speaking African state with which it has a defense agreement (as it does with 8 former colonies and Zaire), France comes to the aid of its ally. This it did with Chad on repeated occasions until 1990, with Zaire in 1977-78 and against internal unrest in 1991, with Rwanda since 1990, and with Mauritania against the Polisario in 1978. When the conflict occurs between French-speaking states, France seeks to manage and mediate the dispute, as it did between Mali and Burkina Faso and between Senegal and Mauritania. Belgium has played a similar role in support of its former colonies, in Zaire in 1977-78 and 1991 and in Rwanda in 1990, but other European powers, colonial or not, have tended to stay clear of African disputes. There is little to gain for them. Only in two cases have non-African military personnel actually engaged in combat: Cuban and Soviet troops were used to repel the Somali invasion of Ethiopia in 1977 and the UNITA and the South Africa Defense Force offensives in Angola in 1975-89.

But in a number of conflicts, military supplies from an external sources have provided governments with an edge over rebels supplied from another external source. American and French arms in Morocco and Chad were important elements in bringing government victories over insurgent Polisario and GUNT forces using Soviet equipment, whereas the MPLA government in Angola has been able to use Soviet equipment to resist UNITA insurgents armed with US materiel. More ironically, Ethiopian pilots with Soviet support in 1977-78 were able to use their American planes to defeat Somali troops and WSLF insurgents armed with Soviet equipment. American arms have kept UNITA in the fight in Angola, effectively delaying the reconstruction of the ravaged and destabilized country for nearly a decade. African armies and insurgents alike can only fight with foreign arms, since, except for South Africa, the continent produces almost no arms of its own. On occasion--such as the Somali-Ethiopian and Moroccan-Algerian conflicts--US, Soviet, European and even small-country sources have fueled arms races which contributed to rivalries and conflicts rather than holding them in check.

Management and Resolution of Conflicts

Although the results are not yet in in some important cases such as the Saharan, Sudanese and Eritrean disputes, the fact is that, except for the wars of independence, African interstate conflicts have not changed a thing. In the 1980s and 1990s, Habre (1982) and Deby (1990) in Chad, Yoweri Museveni (1986) in Uganda, and Meles Zenawi (1991) in Ethiopia have come to power through warfare, and Doe (1990), and Siad Barre (1991) have been removed from power without clear successors in Liberia and Somalia, but no borders have been altered, no secessions effected, and no power rivalries settled other than by a reinforcement of the status quo. Nor have African states been able to turn their military conflicts into diplomatic successes. Instead they have fought themselves into stalemates, from which third parties have been needed to extricate them. There is therefore much to credit third-state efforts at conflict management and much to recommend continuing and institutionalized activities in this direction.

African mediators tend to come from heads of neighboring states and current OAU presidents. President Kenneth Kaunda, Daniel Arap Moi, and Kamuzu Banda tried mediating the Mozambican civil war, and President Mobutu Sese Selo attempted mediation in the Angolan civil war in 1989. Presidents Shugu Shagari of Nigeria and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo successfully mediated a phase of the Chadian conflict in 1979 and a succession of OAU presidents mediated a later phase between 1984 and 1986. From another region, Saudi King Fahd hosted a crucial Algerian and Moroccan summit in 1987 over the Saharan issue. Many other attempts have been made in these and other conflicts, with some successes.

African states have also joined in collective defense as a way of handling conflict. OAU plans for an African defense force never came to fruition, and until this year its only Inter-African Force --in Chad in 1981--failed badly, for lack of clear purpose, coordination, and money. However, African groups have put together their own collective forces on occasion. A six-state army from the members of ECOWAS restored some peace to Liberia in the early years of the 1990s, six allies of Zaire contributed forces to repel insurgents in Shaba in 1977 and 1978, two neighbors sent military forces to Mozambique in 1989-90 to quell Renamo rebels, Zaire intervened in Rwanda in 1990, Guinean troops helped put down riots in Sierra Leone in 1973 and 1979 and in Liberia in 1979 and (along with other ECOWAS members) in 1990, and Senegalese troops defeated a rebellion against the Gambian government in 1981. In 1979, Ugandan insurgents supported by Tanzanian troops repelled a Ugandan seizure of Tanzanian territory and overthrew the Ugandan government of Idi Amin supported by Libyan troops. The OAU has now launched a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (with US support).

In addition to mediation and collective defense as means of resolving African conflicts, African states have had recourse to global organizations, notably the UN and the International Court of Justice. Particularly under the leadership of UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN has played an important role of providing the technical arrangements and expertise for carrying out--and even bringing about--the political decision to terminate conflicts. If it refused to support the OAU in the Chad operation, it relieved the OAU of its burden in preparing a referendum in the Western Sahara in 1987-91 and provided the peacekeeping and referendum operation through the UN Technical Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989-90. Other African disputes--such as the Saharan issue in 1974, offshore territorial disputes between Libya and Tunisia in 1982 and between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal in 1989, boundary disputes between Chad and Libya in 1991 and between Mali and Burkina Faso in 1986--have been taken to the World Court, in some cases for final settlement and in others for opinions that help channel the course of the dispute by setting the parameters for a lasting solution.

African Conflict Management Institutions

Three levels of African institutions are available to handle such conflicts in the 1990s, each in a different stage of realization. The OAU is preparing its thirtieth anniversary as the continental conflict management forum. In mid-May 1991, at Kampala, state representatives and private citizens of Africa convened by the Africa Leadership Forum in cooperation with the OAU and the ECA adopted the charter of a parallel organization, the Conference of Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). On the regional level, a number of institutions already exist or are mooted. The Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Government Agency on Drought and Development (IGADD) in East Africa, and the Maghrib Arab Union (UMA) in North Africa have played a role in conflict management. The experience of the Conference on Security and Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE) has been used as a model for a Conference on Cooperation and Security in Southern Africa (CCSSA). The remainder of this paper will make a comparative evaluation of both the process of forming or reforming these institutions and the promise of conflict management that each contains, and then turn to some concrete policy proposals for external support from the United States.

The OAU was created in 1963 for the purpose of managing conflict among African states and pursuing conflict against colonial rule and apartheid, the

product of an agreement on lowest common denominators between the unionist Casablanca Group and the statist Monrovia Group of African states. For conflict-management purposes, the OAU was designed as a collective security system, in which the collective efforts of all members were to be focussed on any other member who transgressed the rules of the continental system. Once the transgression was repulsed or repaired, all members were again free to form flexible coalitions on other issues. For anti-colonial purposes, the OAU was designed as a collective defense system, in which the joint efforts of all members were to be focused on pre-designated external enemies who transgressed the new rules of the world system. Members are committed to basic principles such as "the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration," and also to the "respect for...sovereignty and territorial integrity" and "non-interference in...internal affairs" reinforced by "unreserved condemnation...of political assassination...and subvers[ion]" (art III).

The mechanisms provided for these activities were a separate Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, and, ultimately, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the annual summit. The Commission was never constituted, essentially because it was impossible to situate its role. It could not be made up of some heads of state without their constituting an inner elite, a notion that was explicitly eliminated by the first principle of the Charter declaring "the sovereign equality of all Member States" and implicitly by the repeated defeat of a proposal for a "Security Council" of selected members who would act for the collectivity in security cases. On the other hand, it could not be made up of independent wisemen--judges or lesser political figures--because they had no basis on which to dictate policy to sovereign states. That left only a mediation and conciliation body made up of all heads of state, that is, the annual summit.

The annual summit has indeed acted effectively to manage conflict within its mandate through a number of different and more subtle mechanisms. The ultimate authority remains the summit itself, hamstrung by its inability to offend any member but seeking to act nonetheless in ways that will uphold principles and through the light of official notice on unprincipled conflict. Resolutions have tended to uphold, deplore and urge, rather than to call for, condemn and decide. The summit has, however, found other, less institutionalized mechanisms for handling conflict. One is the corridors of the summits, where the presence of heads of state is often used by their colleagues to mediate, conciliate and provide their good offices. The other is the ad hoc commission, appointed for the occasion as the temporary replacement of the Commission on Mediation, Arbitration and

Conciliation for specific conflicts. Membership typically includes regional neighbors, friends of both sides and neutrals, representatives of coalitions, tendencies and regions. Ad hoc commissions records have been encouraging--a success rate of one in three cases handled; although often success is only temporary, that is the nature of conflict management, giving the parties time to hesitate, reconsider, and delay.

The OAU summit has been particularly useful in enunciating and upholding principles which define conflicts and legitimize solutions. Although this activity is amorphous and debatable, it has been arguably effective in preventing many conflicts, particularly of irredenta, secession and domestic interference. By the same token, in the process of upholding some primary principles for its membership, it had hampered its own ability to manage conflict in other ways. Furthermore, these same major principles are suddenly under erosive attack in the 1990s.

The most effectively upheld principle is the sanctity of inherited boundaries. Since any African state can have a boundary dispute if it wants one, the absence of countless such disputes is testimony, among others, to the effectiveness of OAU support for its norms. Other evidence is found in the resolution on the illegitimacy of Somalia's irredentist claims, the difficulty of Morocco's claims over the Western Sahara in the absence of a confirming referendum, and the problems encountered by Libya and Uganda in asserting competing criteria for boundary changes. However, this principle has undergone some major assaults in the beginning of the 1990s, opening up the feared Pandora's box to other conflicts. The Eritrean victory over the Ethiopian empire brought a promise of a referendum in 1993, the UN-sponsored referendum in the Western Sahara in 1992 opened the possibility of a confirmation of Morocco's claims, and the Libyan hold on the Aouzou strip of northern Chad remains unshaken, although a decision of the International Court of Justice is awaited for 1992. The OAU has had no role in any of these developments except for symbolic co-sponsorship of the Sahara referendum.

The other major principle upheld by the OAU summit is the sanctity of African state sovereignty, primarily against interference in internal affairs. In view of the fragility of the new African states, this task has turned out to be the most important one of the organization, surpassing conflict management and even liberation when necessary as a goal. Thus, most notably, in the Biafran conflict, where the OAU could conceivably have played a role of reconciliation but at the cost of recognizing "Biafra" as a party, the organization's main contribution was in buttressing Nigeria's claim to sovereign unity. A similar situation obtained in

regard to the Eritrean conflict, with even clearer overtones of thwarted liberation. Indeed, most of Africa's major conflicts became impervious to the OAU's conflict management ministrations because they were essentially internal, even if foreign intervention (also by sovereign states who could not be interfered with) was added on to make them even more intractable--Chad, Rwanda, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Mozambique, Senegal, Angola. In the operation of a specific conflict management mechanism, the peace-keeping force (PKF), the OAU's only experience, in Chad in 1981, was hamstrung by the inability of the Summit to provide funding or give clear instructions for fear of impinging on Chad's sovereignty.

Thus the OAU finds itself in a dilemma, caught between the primary principles that it defends minimally well but which keep it from moving on to other almost equally primary principles that it cannot implement. OAU members have repeatedly called for reforms, but the same vicious circle keeps reforms from being in the primary interest of many of the members. Revival of the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration has been debated and shelved in the mid-1970s and again in the later 1980s. At the 1991 summit, the Administrative Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim proposed lifting the non-interference prohibition; at the 1992 summit, a Security Council-like bureau was instituted to help the Secretary General provide rapid responses to sudden crises. Neither Eritrea, Somaliland or Southern Sudan has yet entered the OAU but such a request would bring in reforms of the membership criteria. Like the UN, the OAU represents a consensus on lowest common denominators that makes it impervious to reform attempts, until external situations have changed and made the current lowest denominator no longer common.

The CSSDCA was proposed to break out of this stalemate, through the pursuit of a parallel reform outside the OAU, yet with OAU co-sponsorship and in the presence of five African heads of state and three prime or foreign ministers. The Kampala Document responded to a resolution of the OAU 1990 Summit; it was subsequently discussed in the 1991 and 1992 Summits at Abuja and Dakar, and was recommended for adoption by the Council of Ministers in February 1993 for the next Summit in June in Cairo. The Kampala Conference in 1991 was held to reform a regional security organization that could not reform itself from within. Like the OAU Charter, the Kampala Declaration, in its "Security Calabash," subscribed to a number of principles on the peaceful resolution of conflict and a specific reference to collective security, but it also added some broader ideas such as conflict prevention, and containment, good neighborliness, military self-reliance, and food security. The "Stability Calabash" contains a number of important guidelines for the establishment and maintenance of an open, pluralist polity.

The mechanisms proposed at Kampala also owe something to the OAU but include some innovations. "Africa, under CSSDCA, should revitalize the operational effectiveness of the OAU Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration," a curiously opaque formulation. At the same time, an Elders Council for Peace, "pre-eminently comprised of the most distinguished personalities and African elder statesmen," is to be "empowered under the CSSDCA" with discretionary authority "to effect a measure of intervention in national security problems of participating member states" through reconciliation, mediation or peace-keeping operations. The latter are given separate and more detailed treatment as "a continental peace-keeping machinery" under CSSDCA. In addition, confidence-building measures (CBMs) such as exchange of military information and joint military activities, a non-aggression pact coupled with a collective defense agreement, and the reduction and reporting of military expenses, creation of an African arms industry, and the introduction of national military service are all proposed. There are no mechanisms offered for enforcing the stability principles.

The effectiveness of the security mechanisms cannot be examined on the ground, since they are only proposals within the CSSDCA Calabash patch. In principle the ideas are sound, all useful elements in building a collective security system, not only by providing for means of responding against a break of security but also by lowering insecurity and heightening mutual confidence. Individually, however, some of the mechanisms can be examined in their previous history within the OAU system, where they have been used. The Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, as already discussed, was structurally flawed and so inoperative. The CSSDCA proposal does not indicate how the structural flaw is to be remedied and the Commission's operational effectiveness revitalized, but there may be a hope that times have changed and African heads of state are now more open to the good offices of Commission members. None of the problems of reform is special to Africa, it takes a peculiar coincidence of members' policy and will to overcome the objections of sovereignty and create an effective intervention force and a prior cease-fire, and it requires sizeable resources from within or outside the system to support a durable PKF operation.

The greatest novelty, produced by an obvious change in conditions is the African Peace Council of elder statesmen. The precedent and example is found in the activities of former Nigerian head of state, Gen. Olasegun Obasanjo, the animator of the Africa Leadership Forum and mediator in the Sudanese conflict, now joined by other retired heads of state in good standing, such as Leopold Sedar Senghor, Aristide Pereira, Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda. Such figures were not available to augment the OAU system thirty years ago, so in this case changed

conditions can be attributed to making a proposed reform possible. The other proposals can only hang their hopes for operationality to a changed awareness based on experience.

"The CSSDCA is a process" rather than an institutional structure, although it does call for a permanent secretariat and a summit conference for periodic review purposes every two years. It will thus inevitably be part of or parallel to the OAU system. More precisely, it can be a mechanism for introducing reforms into the OAU system, or--like the Franco-African Summits--it can fill in the holes in the unreformed OAU system with its own operations. While it can ride for a while on African frustrations with the weaknesses of the OAU and optimism over the new era of democracy and the end of the cold war, its real test of relevance and effectiveness will come--as it did with CSCE--first, as its repeated messages of human rights and democracy gradually informs the norms of the system and, second, when it is called to deal with a specific conflict.

It is hard to imagine a specific test case of CSSDCA conflict management as an example. A conceivable opportunity would be a war of Zairean or other state's succession. Two general scenarios can be envisaged. One would be preemptive, in which the state would go into political receivership, with the African Peace Council overseeing the democratization process; the support of the army would be crucial to this phase. African elders would have to negotiate with the various factional leaders to create an agreement to follow the procedures and principles of the Stability Calabash. Technical and administrative assistance from democratic African states would be required to keep the process on track, until a new legitimate government were elected and installed. This scenario could easily slip into the second, where armed rebellion would be the nature of the problem, the army would be split, and external support (from among African states, the Middle East, Europe and the US) would be available for various factions. In addition to the actions of the first scenario, the second would require ceasefire negotiations and a PKF, with both financial and operational coordination with the UN. The situation would resemble the Congo crises of the early 1960s, probably closer to the second crisis of 1964 where the OAU was busy but ineffectual.

CSSDCA is in gestation at a time of crisis in the OAU system. Many of the tasks it outlines are beyond the OAU and therefore appropriate to a new set of institutions. Others, such as conflict management, are tasks the OAU originally claimed and could grow into, if changed conditions allowed it to overcome its structural inhibitions. CSSDCA has abolished these inhibitions by fiat, declaring that democratic stability, security, development and cooperation are goals that override the previous concerns for sovereignty, self-determination, and regime

support and the previous limitations in financial and military support. Both the effectiveness and the effect of that abolition remains to be put to the test.

Regional institutions are currently the institutions most utilized for conflict management and have an important potential for the future. Four regional institutions which have played a major security role--UMA, CEAO, ECOWAS, IGADD--were formed wholly or in part for non-security, essentially economic purposes, and in all but the first security was added on soon or later afterwards. The CEAO of six French-speaking states, established in 1973, added an Agreement on Non-Aggression and Defense (ANAD) to its economic cooperation provisions, and the 16-member ECOWAS, founded in 1975, provided a non-aggression and mutual defense protocol in 1978 and twelve years later set up a Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia. The six-member IGADD, established in 1986 to deal with endemic conditions of the Horn, was required at its first meeting to begin a conflict management process between Ethiopia and Somalia, although it was unable to follow up with conflict resolution before the Somali state fell into ruins. Unlike the others, the UMA of five North African states was created in 1989 to overcome the conflict that was tearing apart the region over the Western Sahara.

CCSSA, not yet operational, is the regional version of CSCE or CSSDCA for southern Africa and proposed successor to the regional collective security alliance, the Front Line States (FLS), and the parallel economic cooperation agreement, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The idea of CCSSA arose from the annual Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa in Arusha in 1991, in a situation similar to that of CSCE, that is, an area of sharp conflict which suddenly disappeared, where the parties sought a supple common framework to provide order and conflict management to replace the old conflict order. Unlike the Middle East or even continental Africa, where CSCE lessons are often invoked, the southern African regional history during the transition from the battleline over apartheid and the division of the cold war closely parallels the European experience during the removal of the Iron Curtain. Because regional reconciliation is the basis of the CCSSA, inauguration would be appropriate through a well-prepared regional summit either before or after the Angolan and South African elections.

Regional organizations operate as agencies of conflict management through standard mechanisms--summit, secretariat, eventually a military committee. Although the UMA has moved to majority decisions except in case of war, the consensus rule generally operates at the various regions' summits and is important for establishing the norms and agreements required for conflict management. Regional organizations are composed of smaller numbers of states

than continental organizations, with greater direct interests in the regional conflicts and their management. They tend to reflect the structural inequalities of the region, as opposed to the notions of equality within the more numerous and more widespread membership of a continental organization.. That structure also provides greater leverage for mediators without destroying the consensual basis of norms and restraints that smaller members bring. Yet regional agencies do-- and must--operate within the continental framework, lest they break away and establish their own norms, exacerbating conflict along the borders between regions. Just as the FLS was the operating arms of the OAU in Southern Africa, regional organizations operate within the norms established at the continental level, by the OAU and eventually the CCSSDCA as well, with a better chance of implementing them.

Regional organizations have provided Africa with its most striking instances of military cooperation and diplomatic reconciliation. The FLS provided security as well as diplomatic coordination in conflicts in Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe and later in Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. The CEAO brought the Mali-Burkinabe war of 1986 to resolution. For all its normal difficulties, the ECOMOG experience has been a remarkable case of combined diplomatic and military collaboration on the ground; it has gradually overcome uncertainties over its mission, has brought other factions within ECOWAS into supportive diplomacy, and has benefitted from the financial commitment from Nigeria of undisclosed proportions. These three elements are the necessary ingredients of any successful security operation, and they have never been present before in any African collaborative operation. A democratic Nigeria may have difficulty in providing the same political and financial support.

External Assistance--An American Role

Conflict management cannot be forced on conflicting regions, nor are African conflict the responsibility of outside powers. But left to their own devices, Third World regional conflicts force their way on global agendas, at times and in terms not in our interest or to our liking. An effort by African neighbors, with outside powers' backing, to hold a conference of local forces in Somalia in early 1991 would have gone far to save hundred of thousands of lives and billions and dollars. External and African support for Mobutu's retirement when his term ran out earlier this year would have saved the fragile Zairean democratic movement from grinding destruction. Many other examples can be proposed and debated, still more constructive is consideration of specific measures by which the United States can help in conflict prevention and reduction.

1) The Somali experience, with potential calls from Angola, Mozambique, Liberia and Zaire, show that African states in the process of collapse often need emergency assistance in reestablishing their civil structures after the work of the PKF has been accomplished. Military forces are needed to restore security so that government and society can function again, but the ravages of conflict frequently mean that the mechanisms of civil society and administration are also destroyed. Emergency stopgap measures are needed to provide for ready assistance, yet the need poses all the problems of standby military intervention forces.

An appropriate answer comes in the form of reserve units of "Blue Hats", training as "weekend administrators" and ready for seconding when the call is issued by the UN Security Council, just as military reserve units (including military government units) are available for call-up when US forces are required for military operations or, in some other countries, when assignments for UN Blue Helmets are issued. Blue Hats' functions include police, health and hospital, post and telecommunications, local government and other types of administration. They could be organized as part of the military reserves or national guard, under the Defense Department, or as a new venture under State Department aegis. The Inspectors Corps of the United Nations is currently working on a similar proposal.

2) For all the importance of regional and subregional organizations in handling conflicts in Africa, their operations are severely constrained by the vagaries of staff operations in a society of chronic arrears. Talented staff members are difficult to keep; organizational activities are difficult to maintain. These organizations are the product of their members, and if the budgets are not met it is their members' fault. But in a real world of weak Third World economies, the necessary monies are not always available or made available (The US has its own problems with arrears in the international organizations to which it belongs). The OAU received about \$2 of its \$24 million assessments in 1992, and OAU official says "it will be lucky" receive \$4 million of its \$28 million this year. Yet the African states and outside states with global responsibilities alike benefit from regional African organizations that create a reliable and supportive context for conflict management and that are ready to take action when needed.

It would be useful for the United States to consider financial assistance to African regional organizations through direct budgetary support for staff. The US currently has given some support for OAU operations, under an understandable reasoning that holds current accounts to be members' responsibility and special

operations eligible for external support. But, as in any organization, it is frequently more difficult to find funding for permanent staff than for highly visible special operations. Special controls would have to be instituted to insure economical expenditures, as with any foreign aid effort.

3) Democracy is a process, not a state of perfection, and its meaning is philosophical as well as operational. African societies are caught up in the wave of democratization and incumbent rulers do their best to retain control in the storm. Democracy is not measured merely by free and fair elections, or even by fairly contested elections, anymore than it depends on alternance or throwing the incumbents out. Democracy is government carried out by democrats, by politicians committed to a respect of society's right freely to chose and freely to repent its previous choice, without punishment. Democratization is a learning process, a process of improvement over past practices, not simply a matter of being democratic or not.

The US needs to be clearer in its statements and explanations about democracy and democratization, providing both inspirational and operational guidance for African states seeking consumation of their struggle for national self-determination. In Algeria, the US has deplored the cancellation of elections about to be won by a party which promised that it would hold no more democratic elections. In Zaire, it has sought compromise with a dictator who has repeatedly repudiated his own agreements with a struggling democratic movement. In Angola, an election that produced a winner also produced a loser capable of overthrowing the electoral process. Explaining the subtleties of democracy and the gradual process of democratization is no easy task, and African opinion, ever suspicious and too prone to conspiracy explanations, is quick to see in democratization the political equivalent of structural adjustment, an imposition from outside. Democracy needs to be related to Africans' concerns and practices, and championed more comprehensively in American official statements. Electoral confrontations that transform violent conflicts into political contests should be seen as establishing the proportions of support for a power-sharing arrangement (however delicate), and not as a winner-takes-all decision leaving a wounded tiger at loose

4) Very few Africans study, analyse, teach, or write on the various aspects of conflict management, reduction, resolution and prevention. There is no ready context for thinking about ways of reducing conflicts among African states and no ready community of support for policies of handling conflict across borders. African statesmen have been creative and active, but without any organized

backup for their work. More broadly, African societies almost universally lack a public forum for the discussion of foreign issues. Such conditions are signs of a developed society, but they can also be part of the development process and need not await a higher stage of development to be instituted. Both types of institution can be fostered by the US, possibly with the help of other interested countries.

It would be useful to promote the constitution of a group of African experts, from inside and outside government service, to meet regularly with American and other specialists in conflict management and to develop a common language and sense of community in support of such practices throughout the continent. The goal would be to set up an experience somewhat similar to the Dartmouth Conferences of the Kettering Foundation, but devoted to inter-African conflict management, not to US-African relations. The Brookings Institution's African Studies Program, in conjunction with the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and other similar programs, has considered such an activity but it needs support and organization. The Global Coalition for Africa has made efforts toward development in this direction. The Carnegie Corporation and MacArthur Foundation have contributed to related activities but a broader Africa-based effort is required.

Similarly, the development of public fora for discussion of foreign and especially inter-African relations among civic leaders in and out of government is a basic requirement for an informed democracy, not a luxury of development or an elite club. Tunisia has such an Association for International Studies but the rest of the continent is bare of similar efforts. African countries need their own Councils on Foreign Relations to raise awareness and to promote free discussion; the Council based in New York could be instrumental in helping African countries create their own bodies, if given appropriate support.

4) Boundaries constitute a major cause of African conflicts. While the frequent judgment holds that African boundaries are artificial, they are no more so than any other boundaries. It is the drawing of lines through any human community that is artificial, and no boundaries anywhere coincide neatly with ethnic, geographic, social and economic divides. Africa's problem is that its boundaries are recent and therefore need to be "Africanized"--to be made part of the life and history of the individual African states and societies. If this is not to be done by the time-honored ways of war, it must be done by equally established means of diplomacy. One major technical weakness of African boundaries that bears comparatively easy solution is the fact that though most are delimited (defined on a map), many are not demarcated (marked on the ground).

Some African states have made it a point of their foreign policy to demarcate their boundaries with their neighbors. In the process of demarcation, neighbors can often discover and resolve anomalies and ambiguities which, if left unattended, could be the cause or excuse for conflict in times of worsened relations. Outside powers, no matter how well intentioned, cannot push African states to demarcate their borders. But they can provide technical assistance and training in the work of boundary demarcation as a way of enabling African states to pursue the Africanization of their boundaries. An American program for this activity would be a specific contribution to the prevention of conflict.

Conclusion

The causes of conflict in Africa remain, and its incidence can be expected to rise. The continent needs to improve its mechanisms for dealing with rising conflict, lest the impending changes in norms on boundaries, non-interference, state integrity, and governance, added to continuing structural rivalries, tear the continent apart. A frank look at the OAU and its proposed parallel structure, CSSDCA, plus increased attention to (sub)regional mechanisms for conflict management, is needed. The front line of conflict management, however, is conflict prevention, through defended norms, demarcated boundaries, respect for and non-interference in democracy, and active diplomacy



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HEARING:

PEACE KEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Statement By:

Vivian Lowery Derryck
President

THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE

March 31, 1993

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, too, for your initiative in organizing this hearing on an issue of paramount importance to Africa early in your chairmanship of the Africa Subcommittee. Conflict resolution is the major impediment to development in Africa. In 1993, the costs of peace-making and peace-keeping assistance to Somalia, Angola, Liberia and Mozambique from regional, multilateral and bilateral donors will exceed the costs of total development assistance to all the countries of sub-Saharan Africa from all donors combined. These conflicts graphically indicate quite simply that there can be no development when conflicts overshadow even the best efforts in strengthening education, health care, agriculture and other sectors.

Mr. Chairman, today's hearing takes me back to two years ago, almost to the date. On March 14, 1991, I testified before Congressman Mervyn Dymally on then-pending foreign assistance legislation. Congressman Dymally asked what I would consider the most urgent priority for action in Africa and I replied without hesitation that conflict resolution was the most pressing, intractable problem facing the continent.

It was true two years ago and it is true today. While the world has changed dramatically, Africa still suffers from the ravages of greedy, powerful men holding on to power for too long.

Two years is a short time in this decade that precedes the change of a millennium. Yet in the past two years, we have seen extraordinary movement in African politics to governments that are more open, more transparent and more inclusive. At the same time, responses to conflicts have had mixed results at best.

Within two years, Ethiopia has moved from the dictatorship of Mengistu to the guided democracy of the EPRDF. Angola, with U.S., Russian and Portuguese help, professed the end of its civil war. Now, spurred by Jonas Savimbi's rejection of what others saw as free and fair elections, both factions have reverted to arms. Somalia has degenerated into a human hell with more than 350,000 dead and literally no government. The country that would be Somalia is in a state of anarchy.

Liberia has become a regional conflict with spillovers into Sierra Leone and Guinea, while fully half of the Liberian population is either internally displaced or outside the country as refugees. Sudan, Zaire, Togo are all new crises spots that have erupted between March 14, 1991 and March 31, 1993. At present, fully 14 conflicts mar the peace in Africa.

But we have made some progress, too. In May 1991, the Kampala Forum gathered more than 500 Africans who discussed popular participation and the expansion of pluralism. The notion of an

African version of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was raised by General Olusegun Obasanjo, former head of state of Nigeria and current president of the Africa Leadership Forum. He and his colleagues proposed a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa which would include a Council of Elders which would be able to work on dispute resolution and an African parliament which could tackle continent-wide issues. The idea was introduced at the OAU Abuja Summit of 1991 and further discussions are ongoing.

In April of 1992, the Council of Elders was inaugurated at Arusha and has been involved in some conflict mediation since. For instance, South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu travelled to Cameroon after the disastrous October 1992 elections and General Obasanjo has been a tireless advocate for a regional mechanism which would address African issues of peace and security. He has observed elections in various countries, most notably Angola where his voice added considerable weight to the assertion that the elections were free and fair.

In addition, there is a new OAU acknowledgement of the primacy of conflict resolution. Under the auspices of the African-American Institute, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim visited Washington, D.C. earlier this month and discussed changes occurring on the continent. One of the changes he highlighted was the new recognition among member states that the continuing conflicts are sapping Africa of much needed development dollars and harming Africa's image as a potential site for new investments. In a sea change, the OAU Council of Ministers is considering that a mediation and conflict resolution unit be established with either line reporting to the OAU Secretariat or to the mediation committee.

Traditionally, diplomats and others have talked about two phases of conflict resolution: peace-making and peace-keeping. Within the UN system, the concept of preventive diplomacy, new two years ago, has gained currency as the most cost-effective way to approach regional conflicts. Also, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali has highlighted a fourth area of involvement in the whole field of conflict resolution. The Secretary-General has raised the concept of post-conflict reconstruction, or post-conflict peace-building.

Despite these positive developments, the past two years have been rocky for conflict resolution in Africa. Nevertheless, we have learned new lessons. First, observers have a new appreciation of the extent to which sovereignty has been an obstacle to conflict resolution in Africa. When many of us were encouraging UN intervention in Liberia, we were told by African and western diplomats that sovereignty was an inviolate principle. Similarly, when we suggested that in Somalia the magnitude of human suffering demanded action, initially the sovereignty principle was a Damocles

sword, preventing action.

The ECOMOG intervention in Liberia is a dramatic and appropriate break with a concept that has outlived its usefulness in civilian strife situations where human suffering reaches a widescale peak. Now we are finally moving to a period in which the concept of sovereignty is a devalued currency. In the African post Cold War world, sovereignty should no longer be the obstacle to humanitarian interventions such as Somalia.

Our second lesson has taught us that while ideology is no longer a driving force, other deep-seated animosities can just as easily conflagrate civil wars. Formerly in Burundi and currently in Rwanda, we have witnessed that the deep schisms which divide peoples are still in evidence as ethnicity and religion have replaced one vitriol with another. Resolving conflicts is just as intractable, if not more so, when the deep-seated animosities of ethnic stereotypes and racial and religious prejudice are at work.

Third, Africa, though marginalized, is still an integral part of an interdependent planet. Techniques and strategies of conflict resolution that have worked in other areas of the world may have applicability in Africa and vice versa. A colleague described the vehemence and venom with which a Bosnian Serb told him that he didn't want food or blankets and, furthermore, if my colleague didn't have a gun to give him, my colleague should go home. The Bosnian spat out that he would not rest until he saw Muslims dead. In this instance, where were the NGOs that specialized in mediation and reconciliation? This is an area rich for transferability of successful strategies between regions and one in which Africans can contribute. For example, some of the groups that have worked successfully in Liberia could offer their skills to the Bosnians.

Fourth, we have learned that in Africa the military is pivotal in all phases of conflict resolution. The military can foment or moderate preventive diplomacy, thwart or support peace-keeping and interrupt the process of peace-making. The military is also a key factor in reconciliation and reconstruction and peace-building.

Mr. Chairman, these four lessons from the past two years: 1) sovereignty as an obstacle to international action for humanitarian relief; 2) the decline of ideology and rise of ethnic and religious hatreds; 3) the applicability of strategies from one region to another; and 4) the power of the military to impede or facilitate the conflict resolution process at any step, have led AAI to renew its commitment to aid in the establishment of an African institution that could deal with these issues.

In August 1991, AAI had submitted an unsolicited proposal to establish a center for conflict resolution in Africa. The work with Congressman Dymally, AID officials and other interested parties resulted in Section 1005 of the FY92 Foreign Assistance

legislation of the House which directed the AID Administrator to take steps to establish an African Center for Conflict Resolution. But without legislation, the center was not funded and, therefore, did not materialize.

Mr. Chairman, the Center was a good idea in 1991 and it is still a good idea. Africa would benefit from a center devoted exclusively to conflict resolution on the continent. The need is acute. Currently, there is nowhere on the continent a center that monitors conflicts and potential conflicts, alerts Africans--including those involved and others--of the danger signals and offers an impartial meeting ground to participants in an armed conflict or a minor crisis so that they can meet with mediation leaders and conflict resolution specialists.

The conflict resolution proposal was detailed in an unsolicited proposal from AAI to U.S. AID on August 26, 1991. The proposal is being updated and we would be pleased to make the revised version available to you.

Organization. The Center would be organized with a Board of 12 to 15 Governors comprised of senior Africans and internationalists knowledgeable about Africa and its conflicts, and a group of senior professionals based in Africa. A small, two-person secretariat in the U.S. would coordinate U.S. input.

Policy direction of the Center would be guided primarily by the non-resident, predominantly African governors, eminent persons who could commit themselves to active involvement in the settlement of disputes and who are knowledgeable about African political situations where tensions exist, have had extensive experience in governance and know the multilateral community well.

The Center would be Africa-based and run on a day-to-day basis by a 14-person secretariat. Staff for the secretariat would include professional program officers, a mediation specialist, a librarian/management information specialist and an office manager.

The center would be organized to assure that it could operate with full independence. In the original submission we developed criteria for choosing a site, but we have now concluded that the Center could probably operate best with dual sites in West and southern/central Africa, perhaps in Benin and Botswana.

The Center would be independent of both the OAU and the UN. As the FY92 legislation proposed, "the Committee believes that the Center should maintain an autonomous posture with no formal or official association or nexus with regional or international organizations such as the Organization of African Unity or the United Nations in order to preserve its effectiveness and to insulate it from organizational pressures and influences. However, informal exchanges and associations with such organizations would

be desirable and are encouraged." (P. 218)

The Organization of African Unity, the principal African organization with the mandate to act on resolution of African conflicts, is bound by its own principle of noninterference in the affairs of member states. While Liberia and Somalia are exceptions, there is no discernible move among African states to modify the principle of sovereignty in terms of state-to-state relations and therefore it will remain difficult to gain consensus or permission to intervene in conflict situations without an invitation from the government in question.

The Center's leadership would collaborate with governmental and nongovernmental institutions that seek to integrate democracy and development, cooperate with human rights and refugee groups currently active at the site of conflicts, and build on the experience of other centers and institutions that are active in the study and resolution of conflicts.

Major Activities. The center would be developed as a private organization, representing no specific ideology, no national viewpoint, but simple interest and professional ability in resolving conflict to the satisfaction of the parties concerned.

Four major forms of conflict seem to dominate Africa: 1) ethnic, racial and religious-based conflicts; 2) ideologically based conflicts which pit contrasting views of governance and economic organization against each other; 3) boundary-based conflicts which result from disputes over boundaries drawn at independence, land ownership and property rights; and 4) internationally fomented conflicts that are prompted by external actors.

The proposed center would address the different types of conflict by providing three basic services: 1) collect, analyze and share data on conflict in Africa; 2) foster solutions to conflict through mediation services; and 3) provide follow-up services to aid in the implementation of any agreed upon resolution.

The Center would have a two-pronged mandate including both research and action. Research should focus on four areas: a) studies on the impact of ethnicity and religion on conflict resolution; b) establishment of an early warning system by assessing signs of impending crisis; c) collaboration with conflict resolution centers in other regions of the developing world, Europe and the U.S.; and d) development of an inventory of skilled African political scientists, former political leaders and others who are skilled in preventive diplomacy.

In the action aspect of the proposed center's mandate, work would concentrate on: a) sending members of the Board of Governors

and senior professional staff to negotiate conflicts; and b) working with African militaries to establish an intra-African force.

Funding. If Africans are to be fully invested, they must have a financial stake in the process. Here the concept of matched co-funding is appropriate. I would propose a U.S. start-up grant, matched by African contributions from ministries of foreign affairs and NGOs that wanted affiliated status.

The Association of African Universities could contribute a fellow each year. The African Academy of Sciences could nominate a person. Those two fellows would be paid by an AID grant administered by a U.S.-based PVO.

The UN could also contribute to the Center without infringing on the Center's autonomy. The UN is an active player in conflict resolution activities in Africa and currently has operations in Angola, Somalia, Western Sahara and a special envoy in Liberia. The Secretary-General's blueprint, An Agenda for Peace, focuses primarily on conflict resolution and two UN world conferences will also impact on conflict resolution. The Second World Conference on Human Rights will occur later this year and a World Summit for Social Development is being considered for 1995.

Moreover, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), has been designated as the lead UN agency for development activities in Africa and ECA Executive Secretary Layashi Yaker has indicated his strong interest in pursuing conflict resolution. A contribution of seconded personnel and financial support would be appropriate and most probably possible.

Over time, the concept of the Center and the success of its work will attract the attention of other donor organizations, as it becomes an internally recognized center with a conflict resolution specialty. An example of this funding evolution is the International Development Law Institute in Rome. Initially funded as a private nonprofit organization with support from A.I.D. and the administrative backing of AMIDEAST, IDLI developed its own sources of financing and has recently become an international organization.

New AID reorganization will focus on five areas, one of them being peace-making and peace-keeping. Creation of an African Center for Conflict Resolution would fit neatly into the DFA and demonstrate U.S. commitment to concrete help for this endeavor. Mr. Chairman, I would urge that the upcoming development coordination/foreign assistance bill support the establishment of a conflict resolution center. According to AAI's original budget projections, such a center could be begun with approximately \$936,000. If we are looking at a DFA of approximately \$800 million, this would be money well spent. The World Bank estimates that the cost of demobilization for the MPLA and UNITA forces will reach \$635 million. If a Center such as that proposed had been in place it

may have saved countless lives and certainly millions of dollars.

Mr. Chairman, for Africa there is no greater need than to address the root causes of conflict. The continent faces enormous challenges in the decade ahead. Economic and political restructuring, expanded citizen participation in governance, increased agricultural productivity, preservation of the environment and strengthened human resources are challenges Africa must meet in times of reduced resources and reduced attention to the continent. Africa simply cannot compete until the continent moves away from internecine warfare and faces squarely the challenge of reducing tensions and finding compromises that allow various ethnic and religious groups to live together harmoniously.

Attention to conflict resolution can help that process. Again, I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your farsighted leadership in this area.

STATEMENT OF

CHESTER A. CROCKER

before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MARCH 31, 1993

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the vitally important topic of peacemaking, conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa. As one who has devoted much of his career to these matters, I can only applaud your initiative in scheduling these deliberations today.

It is appropriate for Americans to reflect on these topics for a number of reasons which I want to mention briefly. First, the U.S. has a long and proud record of engagement in African peacemaking. No country has done more to wind down, manage, mediate, and resolve African conflicts. Our unhappiness with the state of war and peace in Africa should not obscure the reality that our involvement has made a difference and is both respected and welcomed in Africa.

Second, the topic of peacemaking in Africa is important in terms of US values and national interests. The continent is wracked by violent conflict which imposes an intolerable human cost on Africa's peoples and which poses a severe challenge -- if not an absolute roadblock -- to the achievement of other US goals in region. Moreover, US public funds available to support those other goals -- development and market reforms, democracy and human rights -- will be diverted into emergency relief operations, costly peace enforcement missions, and lengthy rehabilitation programs unless the dogs of war can be leashed.

DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

It is important to recognize up front the scope of the challenges faced by African leaders and peoples -- and by those outside the continent who would be of assistance -- in strengthening the capacity for conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa. I have written elsewhere* that we face a worldwide "law and order deficit", by which I mean a shortfall of agreed principles, laws, institutions, mechanisms and capabilities for building a more secure and less violent world.

*"The Global Law and Order Deficit", Washington Post, December 20, 1992.

Nowhere is this more true than in Africa. The scope of this deficit is awesome, and it is, ironically, growing precisely because of the dramatic and hopeful systemic changes of recent years. Our very success in achieving negotiated settlements (e.g., in Mozambique) creates fresh demands on the African and global system for capabilities to implement, monitor, observe, and enforce the resulting agreements. The very success of Africans and outsiders in challenging minority racial domination, single-party autocracy, and military rule is creating fresh demands for capabilities to support democratic transitions so that they do not degenerate into violent conflicts. Meanwhile, in countries not yet committed to building civil societies and multi-party systems, the campaign to achieve these goals destabilizes the status quo. We are discovering the hard truth that liberalization, like repression, can be destabilizing. We are also learning that democratic change and free market reform will not succeed if they coincide -- in practice -- with abandonment and disengagement by the West.

A tremendous panoply of security challenges confronts Africa and Africa's friends today. The potential U.S. response covers a multitude of fields. Let me mention some of the gaps and needs where outside help can make a difference:

--Many African states are over-stocked with the sort of light arms which can tear a fragile society apart when they become available to dissident groups, ethnic factions, and assorted gangs or warlords. In a number of cases, African armies far exceed the legitimate needs and slim budget resources of their countries. In too many countries, the gun represents an ever attractive career opportunity and a badge of status for young men who otherwise have neither. Getting this genie back inside the bottle is a top priority. But it will require creative programs of demobilization, retraining, weapons collection and destruction to make a dent on the problem. The US and other major nations as well as the key donor/lending agencies all have roles to play in addressing this problem.

-- The costs of African conflict take many forms. What is less recognized are the "costs" of peacemaking and conflict resolution. These costs include direct budget expenditures as well as the sunk investments in trained and experienced technical expertise (lawyers, military staffers, communications and intelligence personnel, interpreters, diplomatic talent and conflict-specific specialists, to name a few). The costs may include travel and telecommunications, the hosting of events, and the preparation of documents. A third party mediator which takes on the task of providing professional-quality leadership in the

resolution of a conflict may require the equivalent of a standing, inter-agency task force of 10-15 people who may have to function as a dedicated unit for a prolonged period. To be effective, that unit requires reliable budget, intelligence, and communications support. Africa is richly endowed with skilled professional diplomats and willing elder statesmen with the desire to build peace in their region. But, neither the Organization of African Unity nor most African states possess such a unit today, a fact which helps explain why our African friends remain partially dependent on external peace-making "resources" from the UN, the US, and other sources. There are, however, things we can do to provide technical assistance and transfer capabilities and training in some of these areas so as to help strengthen African security and peacemaking institutions.

-- Another critical ingredient in peacemaking is that subtle mixture of credibility, leverage, legitimacy, and outright political will which is so often necessary to break the back of a conflict. It is not only the special skills, insights and information of a dedicated mediatory task force which are required: it is often essential to back these up with real clout, influence and symbolic authority so that warring parties take the peacemaker seriously, knowing that there may be benefits for cooperation and penalties for obstruction. Africa today has precious little of this "margin of leverage" which can coalesce around a regional peacemaking initiative in a place like, say, Angola or Somalia. This is why the effectiveness of African peacemaking may depend for years to come on the extent to which it is visibly and effectively linked to the resources available in the broader global system, including the UN and the US. The implications for US policy are obvious: we have no higher calling in our African policies than to hone, perfect, and sustain our commitment and our contributions to the vital process of peacemaking.

-- If the costs of peacemaking are significant, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement are, of course, far higher cost items, in terms of both tangible and "political" costs. And, yet, they are absolutely essential. As we have repeatedly learned in places as disparate as El Salvador, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Angola, it is essential not only to make peace but also to keep the peace and, especially, to implement and, if necessary, enforce peace agreements. In fact, it has become increasingly obvious that the peacemaker who does not focus seriously on the implementation side of the equation is not acting responsibly. That said, my point is simply to underscore the obvious reality that African states are

seldom in a position to do these things on their own. That is why the experience of the ECOMOG in Liberia and of the OAU itself in Rwanda represent important watersheds in Africa's experience with regional security issues. Another important trend of recent years is the growing participation of African militaries in UN and regional peacekeeping efforts. This is important as a basis for strengthening the security linkages between Africa and the international system. As African conflicts take up a significant part of the UN peacekeeping agenda, it is fitting that Africans be full participants to help expand the pool of potential peacekeepers. We should consider how best to spend on scarce security assistance and training resources to promote such commonsense goals as weapons standardization and interoperability and regional training coordination.

-- Nor are the tasks of peacekeeping and enforcement exclusively military in the sense of organized, uniformed units: peaceful settlements often call for the deployment of ceasefire observers, police monitors, media and refugee specialists, election observers, and other distinct disciplines. Here, too, it is in our interest as well as Africa's to do what we can to expand African capabilities to keep the peace and make it work.

PRIORITIES FOR US ASSISTANCE

Mr. Chairman, you have asked for specific ideas on programs and funding that could make a difference to conflict resolution in Africa. In considering foreign assistance legislation related to these issues, I would offer you some suggested guidelines.

First, we should not try to do everything that needs doing by ourselves. Africans will not welcome an excessively visible US lead role in all of their most sensitive business. There are other sources of expertise, experience, political leadership, and tangible resources. The time may be approaching when we should discuss with our leading partners and allies (perhaps in the G-7 context) how we can jointly support Africa's particular needs for peacemaking and peacekeeping/enforcement. Some division of effort may be appropriate within a context of priorities that are set in consultation with African leaders.

Second, we should not confine ourselves to one forum or institution in channeling support. Until there is more of a track record, it probably makes sense to support ad hoc and sub-regional initiatives (e.g., ECOMOG) as well as the OAU's embryonic attempts to build its capability for

effective intervention in conflict resolution. A somewhat experimental approach is called for.

Third, we should recognize that many African problems are in reality global, and the solutions will emerge through global as well as regional responses. I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that the important initiatives you are considering are not confined to Africa or defined in an exclusively African context. A strengthened UN capability to act effectively in peacekeeping will translate into strengthened peacekeeping in Africa. An enhanced UN capacity for preventive diplomacy and early warning will help Africans avoid the high costs of conflict.

Fourth, it is of the highest priority to assure that US contributions to UN peacekeeping are placed on a sound financial footing, our arrears caught up, and our planning and budgeting for this purpose related to realistic scenarios for future requirements. We should always press for efficiency in UN operations. But we should never permit the financial tail to wag the foreign policy dog on peacemaking and peacekeeping. It is simply too important. I hold no particular brief for placing peacekeeping in the defense budget versus the foreign assistance accounts. But it is clear that past approaches have not served us well.

Fifth, it is probably appropriate to separate out the accounts for "peacekeeping operations", on the one hand, and what could be termed "peacemaking, peacekeeping training and institution-building" on the other. The first accounts should, of course, be global, and Africa should get its share based on need. The second account could be Africa-specific and located alongside or as part of the security assistance programs. This account could cover a wide range of programs ranging from the secondment of US official experts to help staff up an on-going negotiation ("observers"); the provision of TDY or seconded personnel in response to possible OAU or subregional requests for US experts or training; the provision of budget support for new units or entities created within the OAU to enable it to act preventively and to support OAU-led conflict resolution and peacekeeping; exchanges of staff for internship and training experience between African national and regional bodies and their US (or possibly UN or NATO) counterparts. Following the lead taken by the Bush administration decision to support such assistance to the OAU in 1992, I would hope that your committee would see fit to authorize a regional Africa/OAU peacekeeping item at, say the \$5-10 million level based on ESF, FMF or other resources.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would mention a couple of additional projects related to peacemaking and peacekeeping which reflect my sense of potential high value targets for support. It is not easy to mediate and resolve a conflict if the parties are better informed and better briefed than the

mediator. African peacemakers need much better, real-time information and intelligence than they are likely to have from national or regional means. (UN mediators suffer something of the same handicap.) Taking into account the sensitivity of this subject, I nonetheless believe that this is an area worthy of close study to determine whether it is possible to identify a means of supporting the information requirements of African peacemaking.

Another example of targetted assistance would be to focus attention on the logistic and maintenance support of African peacekeeping units. Though there are exceptions, African military forces tend to possess infantry and light armor or artillery units with little capacity for self-sufficiency in operational conditions. Such forces cannot function as reliable peacekeepers without adequate supplies, logistic support, spares, and maintenance. If there were regional interest in developing such capabilities -- within selected national units or on a central OAU basis, we should find a way to support it. This would advance our interest in seeing an expansion in the pool of effective peacekeepers.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I hope that I have illustrated the range of things we can do to support the development of strengthened peacemaking and peacekeeping capabilities in Africa. Some of these activities have already begun. Others can be done, if they are welcomed by our African partners who will necessarily have to chart the road ahead. But there will be no substitute for continuing US policy leadership and diplomatic engagement on behalf of ending African conflicts.



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